Throughout COP31, SEFiA is following sessions on the economic and social dimensions of climate policy, with a focus on just transition, climate finance, electrification and industrial decarbonisation. On this page, you can find short summaries of each day’s key just transition discussions and major developments.
The broadest agreement at the 10 November session was that the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) should help countries implement their own transition priorities and facilitate access to existing support. The main differences concerned how the mechanism would provide that support, how far its financing role would extend and how it would relate to the existing work programme.
Areas of agreement and convergence
- Moving from dialogue to implementation. The EU, the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Arab Group placed varying emphasis on technical assistance, sharing expertise, identifying needs and gaps, and facilitating international cooperation. The UK’s proposal for an expert network fits within this approach.
- Reflecting national, regional and sectoral circumstances. The EIG emphasised nationally determined just transition pathways and roadmaps. AOSIS called for flexibility to reflect different national circumstances. Azerbaijan stressed the need to account for differing regional needs, while Brazil called for the mechanism’s design to reflect differences across sectors and economies.
- Linking political guidance and technical implementation. Panama, Brazil, AOSIS and Ecuador supported a two-tier structure. The LDCs described distinct governance and technical functions. The EU called for political guidance and implementation to reinforce each other. Which bodies would carry out these functions and what authority they would have remain open.
- Drawing on existing institutions and resources. The EU called for systematic use of existing mandates and capacities. Japan emphasised drawing on existing mechanisms and initiatives, while
- Canada focused on coordinating existing resources and improving coherence across initiatives. The EIG and the Arab Group also highlighted the mechanism’s role in facilitating access to support.
Main areas of divergence
- Financing mandate. The EIG opposes establishing the JTM as a fund and supports a role in facilitating access to existing finance. The Arab Group also proposes a network that facilitates access to finance. South Africa wants the mechanism to strengthen accountability for existing just transition finance and take a stronger role in addressing the quantity and quality of finance. The session notes leave open whether South Africa proposed creating a new fund or mobilising new sources of finance.
- Future of the work programme and timelines. Panama proposes continuing the existing work programme for up to two years while the JTM becomes operational. Norway proposes recognising the work programme under the JTM and establishing a framework through the end of 2036, with an initial five-year term and a five-year renewal period. The EU’s five-year proposal concerns the duration of the work plan. AOSIS wants the JTM to become operational at this session.
- Decision-making authority and governance. Panama and AOSIS emphasise that the mechanism should operate under CMA guidance. Egypt stresses that the mechanism should be Party-driven, while AOSIS proposes a steering or advisory committee and civil society participation. Norway proposes that two co-chairs lead the dialogues, one from a developed country and one from a developing country. How decision-making authority would be distributed and at which stages stakeholders would participate remain open.
- Scope of the mandate. Japan proposes a streamlined structure that draws on existing mechanisms. Canada focuses on coordinating existing resources and improving coherence across initiatives. China also raises the need to prevent development gaps from widening, coordinate trade rules and strengthen economic and industrial cooperation. The EU calls for just transition considerations to be integrated into the Global Stocktake (GST) and into national and sectoral roadmaps.
No explicit disagreement emerged among countries on participation. Interventions focused on different groups and functions. The EIG emphasised gender and intergenerational equity, the LDCs highlighted workers in formal and informal employment, and AOSIS and Burkina Faso stressed local community participation. Peru called for the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples living in voluntary isolation. How these priorities will be reflected in arrangements for representation, consultation and technical support remains open.
The second day focused on how the UAE Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) should continue beyond 2026 and how it should relate to the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM). There was broad agreement that the work programme had provided a valuable space for sharing experience and holding policy dialogue. Many interventions pointed out that the knowledge generated had yet to translate sufficiently into national policies and implementation support. The main difference concerned whether the dialogue function should remain under a distinct work programme or be incorporated into the mechanism.
Areas of agreement and convergence
- Making dialogues more useful for implementation. The G77 and China, the African Group, AILAC, AOSIS, the EU and the UK called, with different emphases, for the knowledge and experience generated by the work programme to inform implementation more directly. AOSIS proposed that dialogue outputs include voluntary tools and policy options that countries could adapt to their circumstances. The African Group called for the programme’s effectiveness to be assessed by how well it supports implementation.
- Retaining the programme’s broad scope. The EU, AOSIS and the Arab Group supported retaining the existing scope and addressing its elements in a balanced manner. The G77 and China, the African Group and AILAC called for more systematic attention to economic diversification. The African Group also pointed to insufficient attention to industrialisation, poverty eradication, equitable participation in value chains, adaptation and resilience, and international cooperation.
- Producing more timely and usable outputs. The G77 and China and AILAC proposed a more standardised approach to note-taking to capture views in a balanced manner. AILAC said delays in publishing dialogue summaries made them harder for Parties to use in negotiations. AOSIS called for reporting templates and stronger follow-up, while the UK called for timely, action-oriented outputs.
- Improving the quality of participation. The G77 and China and the African Group stressed that participants from the Global South should be able to help shape the agenda and contribute meaningfully to discussions. AILAC highlighted small-group formats and giving participants time to prepare for their roles. The UK emphasised hybrid formats and participation by non-Party stakeholders.
Main areas of divergence
- Institutional relationship between the work programme and the JTM. The G77 and China, the African Group, AILAC and AOSIS supported continuing the work programme beyond 2026. The African Group and AOSIS advocated distinct but complementary mandates, with the JTWP continuing policy dialogue and knowledge exchange and the JTM focusing on implementation support. The EIG favoured proceeding under the JTM to avoid creating two institutional structures. Norway also proposed anchoring the work programme within the JTM. The EU proposed retaining the programme’s scope within the JTM and proceeding through a single joint contact group under the subsidiary bodies.
- Duration of the programme and frequency of dialogues. The African Group proposed extending the work programme for three years, taking into account progress in operationalising the JTM. Norway proposed one annual global dialogue in place of two shorter meetings, with two co-chairs, one from a developed country and one from a developing country. The EU supported retaining two dialogues per year. The notes and transcript did not establish a definitive end year for Norway’s longer-term proposal.
- Links to Global Stocktake outcomes and sectoral transitions. AOSIS called for stronger links to the 1.5°C goal and greater attention to implementing the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake (GST), particularly transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner. The EIG proposed that the programme inform the second Global Stocktake (GST2), including its technical dialogue. The UK highlighted the value of sectoral dialogues. The EU called for transitions in industry, transport, buildings and food systems to be considered alongside employment, skills, labour rights and social protection. The Arab Group opposed prioritising specific sectors or energy pathways and using the programme as a separate channel for implementing GST outcomes. It called for preserving the diversity of nationally determined pathways.
- Treatment of trade measures. The EU objected to characterising climate policies aimed at addressing carbon leakage as trade measures. The Arab Group argued that the JTWP could examine how measures with cross-border effects affect workers, communities and developing countries’ policy space, alongside discussions on trade in other forums. Uruguay identified trade conditions and the cost of capital as factors shaping countries’ ability to finance their transitions.
- Implementation support and the role of finance. The African Group said many barriers, including high capital costs, debt, infrastructure constraints and limited access to technology, were beyond the
- reach of domestic policy alone. Nigeria stressed that the JTM should deliver tangible results on access to finance alongside its coordination role and address both the quantity and quality of support. The Arab Group argued that the JTWP review should avoid prejudging the JTM’s mandate.
Stakeholder interventions
- Indigenous Peoples’ rights and participation. Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations (IPO) drew attention to the rights of Indigenous Peoples living in voluntary isolation and in initial contact. They called for self-determination and free, prior and informed consent to guide the operationalisation of the JTM. They also stressed full and effective participation and direct access to support for Indigenous Peoples’ priorities.
- Local and regional governments. The Local Governments and Municipal Authorities constituency (LGMA) called for national transition pathways to reflect local needs and circumstances. It proposed explicitly recognising the local and regional dimensions of the transition within the mechanism and strengthening cooperation across levels of government.
- Business and farmers. Business and Industry NGOs (BINGO) proposed that the JTM serve as a coordination platform that complements national efforts and supports open access to case studies and peer learning. Farmers’ representatives called for national transition pathways to be designed with farmers, including smallholders and family farmers, and for agriculture to receive dedicated attention in international cooperation and climate finance.
Next steps
In closing, the co-chairs returned to the JTM discussions from the first two days. They noted emerging convergence around a Party-driven policy arm and an implementation-oriented arm. Facilitating access to means of implementation, coordination, the role of the Secretariat and civil society participation also featured prominently. The G77 and China and the African Group requested an updated informal note before the end of the first week to prepare for the second week. The co-chairs said they would hear the remaining interventions the following day.
The contact group held three sessions on 12 November. In the morning, parties concluded their exchange of views on the synthesis report on the review of the United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), including proposals for improving its modalities. In the afternoon and evening, parties shared their views on the key messages from the fifth and sixth dialogues, drawing on the 2026 annual summary report. Observers also presented drafting proposals during the evening session. Synthesis report on the review · 2026 annual summary report on the dialogues
There was broad support for continuing the JTWP beyond 2026. The main questions were how the programme should relate to the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) and how the dialogue messages should inform the decision text and implementation. On industrial transformation, South Africa emphasised matching financial instruments to project needs and enabling developing countries to help shape market rules. Egypt set out which investment and social costs finance should cover and what domestic capabilities technology transfer should build. The areas of convergence below reflect common ground across interventions.
1. Continuation, operational arm, under the JTM and complementarity
Convergence. India and South Africa supported continuing the programme for another three years. Ukraine called for it to continue beyond 2026. Canada wanted to preserve the JTWP’s role in exchanging experience and learning from policy practice as the JTM takes shape, and to make that knowledge useful to policymakers. The United Kingdom supported continuation and the sectoral focus of the dialogues. Egypt aligned with the G77, the African Group and the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) and supported continuation in the absence of an explicit objection.
Term or proposal | Country and group positions |
Operational arm | India proposed that the JTWP become the operational arm of the JTM. It called for balanced attention across the programme’s areas of work and cautioned against giving disproportionate weight to particular parties’ priorities. |
Under the JTM | The European Union supported continuing the JTWP under the mechanism. The division of responsibilities under this arrangement remained open. |
Complementarity | South Africa, Kenya, Bolivia and Japan emphasised complementarity. South Africa wanted the programme to inform the JTM’s work and give greater attention to adaptation, resilience and development pathways. Kenya proposed that the JTM support access to affordable and reliable clean energy, particularly for cooking and heating. Bolivia, aligning with the G77 and China, highlighted implementation, access to adequate and predictable finance, participation by workers and Indigenous Peoples, and coverage of sectors beyond energy. |
Separate and mutually reinforcing functions | The Philippines proposed that the JTWP identify challenges and options and that the JTM facilitate access to implementation support within its agreed mandate. It called for voluntary indicators suited to national circumstances to track progress. |
Parallel tracks or integration | China referred to three possible arrangements, including the JTWP and JTM proceeding in parallel and the programme being integrated into the mechanism. The third option remains unclear. China left its preference open at this stage. |
Review before deciding on continuation | Dominica said that the JTWP could help operationalise the JTM. It called for greater attention to climate resilience and the support needed to build it. It wanted the review to conclude before parties decided on continuation. |
Proposals on modalities. The United Kingdom referred to ministerial roundtables alongside the sectoral focus of the dialogues. It also raised hybrid formats, participation by non-Party stakeholders and making dialogue outputs more useful in practice. The details of the roundtable proposal and the full set of five improvements remain unclear. Japan supported retaining existing modalities and updating them where needed. Egypt proposed working with two co-chairs and sharing the secretariat’s workload. Other proposals included retaining all seven elements of the programme’s scope, covering sectors beyond energy, continuing two dialogues per year and maintaining an inclusive, party-driven process. The respective positions of the least developed countries (LDCs) and the EU on these proposals remain unclear. Uruguay, aligning with the G77 and China, referred to a multi-year workplan. The Arab Group called for the review to reflect submissions more evenly, address international cooperation systematically and strengthen outputs while preserving the programme’s scope. The precise scope of its point about the review prejudging the JTM’s mandate remains unclear.
2. Key messages, single compilation and overarching political messages
Convergence. There was support for using both dialogues to inform the decision text. The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) wanted the fifth dialogue’s messages included alongside those of the sixth without weakening them. Uruguay supported a single compilation of key messages from both dialogues. AILAC and AOSIS said they would submit detailed views in writing.
Divergence and proposals. Egypt called for distilling the technical findings into overarching political messages for the decision text. India said that serious concerns remained over some messages from SB64 and that these were still open for negotiation. The AGN wanted the dialogue outputs to inform both the JTWP review and the JTM’s implementation agenda. The Arab Group opposed giving the outputs a prescriptive role in national planning or making them conditions for access to finance.
The drafting question is how to link the dialogue messages’ role in informing the decision to the JTM’s role in facilitating access to implementation support. The Philippines’ proposed wording, facilitate access to implementation support, gives the mechanism a specific function.
3. Food systems, food production systems, food security and water security
Several interventions converged on protecting food security and livelihoods. The differences concerned how to describe the scope of the fifth dialogue and how agricultural value chains should feature in the sixth dialogue’s industrial messages.
Term or proposal | Country, group and observer positions |
Food systems | LMDC and India objected to the term. India proposed food production and food security. An unidentified speaker called for retaining food systems, citing previous COP work. ICLEI proposed retaining urban and peri-urban food systems and emphasised the role of local governments in putting national transition objectives into practice in cities and surrounding areas. |
Food security*, food production systems and *food production | Uruguay called for using these terms, citing the language of the Paris Agreement. It also wanted the text to recognise small-scale producers, family farmers and rural women. |
Water security | An unidentified speaker objected to the term in a national capacity. Brazil emphasised access to water. The landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) highlighted sustainable water and land management, agricultural productivity and approaches suited to national circumstances. |
Agro-processing and coastal livelihoods | Uruguay wanted the sixth dialogue’s messages to cover agro-processing alongside mineral processing and manufacturing. South Africa proposed that the fifth dialogue’s messages address producers’ capacity to process goods, trade and capture value in new markets. The AGN and Panama highlighted the role of coastal communities and small-scale fisheries in food security and livelihoods. |
Climate-resilient agriculture and agricultural livelihoods | Brazil proposed combining traditional practices with new approaches and providing social protection for small-scale producers, family farmers, fishers and informal workers. Nepal called for protecting food security, livelihoods and irrigation infrastructure from climate impacts and addressing structural barriers faced by women in agriculture. |
4. Unilateral trade measures, standards, certification, traceability and shaping markets
Support for addressing impacts under the JTWP. The AGN said that the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) could raise compliance costs and make it harder for small producers to access markets. In its right of reply, it recognised parties’ right to take measures in pursuit of climate objectives. Citing Article 3.5 of the Convention, it called for addressing barriers faced by producers with limited capacity to comply and for providing them with support. The Arab Group said CBAM could adversely affect capital-intensive and hard-to-abate sectors on which developing countries rely. It argued that relevant negotiating forums, including those dealing with trade, complement one another and that the JTWP should also address the just transition impacts of these measures. LMDC and the LLDCs raised compliance costs and barriers to market access. China wanted the key messages to reflect the impacts of unilateral measures.
Divergence over the forum and terminology. The EU said it had adopted binding emissions targets in line with the 1.5°C objective and taken measures to address carbon leakage. It objected to EU policies being singled out and to the characterisation of those policies as unilateral trade measures. It supported discussing trade-related climate measures, including standards, under the Trade and Climate Dialogue. The United Kingdom also pointed to that dialogue for country-specific measures such as CBAM. The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) called for clarity on what the JTWP could contribute alongside other processes dealing with trade and finance.
Proposals on market rules and demand creation. South Africa used shaping markets to argue that developing countries should have a say in the rules and standards governing the markets in which they participate. Uruguay identified trade conditions and the cost of capital as part of the just transition agenda. Uruguay and Kuwait warned that certification and traceability requirements could raise the cost of market entry and referred to Article 3.5 of the Convention. Brazil proposed using public procurement and other demand-side instruments to create markets for low-carbon investment. It linked that proposal to support for locally developed technologies and access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
5. Industrial decarbonisation, right to development, local value addition and climate justice
Development and productive capacity. The AGN, Nigeria and Kenya emphasised local processing, manufacturing and fairer participation in value chains so that developing countries can move beyond exporting raw materials and importing finished technologies. The AGN identified high capital costs, debt, limited technology access and skills gaps as structural barriers. South Africa linked the right to development to equitable access to the economic opportunities created by the transition. It called for investment in local productive capacity and economic opportunities alongside social protection. Egypt proposed that equitable value chains also address how the value created is distributed. The Arab Group identified the right to development and poverty reduction as objectives of industrial transformation. India called for taking account of countries’ stages of development, manufacturing capacity and supply-chain dependencies.
Competitiveness, climate action and clean energy. Canada linked competitive industrial decarbonisation to clean technologies and critical minerals. The United Kingdom emphasised clean energy, energy efficiency, electrification and the circular economy. Nepal wanted clean electricity to support industrialisation in developing countries. Japan said that just transition should advance climate action and highlighted the importance of sectoral transformation for workers. Kenya linked green industrialisation to ecosystem restoration, renewable energy and sustainable agriculture.
Equity language. China called for including climate justice in the key messages and emphasised equity among countries. The Arab Group supported references to equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). Egypt used equity and CBDR in connection with international support and countries’ differentiated responsibilities.
6. Nationally determined, non-prescriptive, technology-neutral, CCUS and carbon management
Term or proposal | Country, group and observer positions |
Nationally determined*, non-prescriptive and *technology-neutral | LMDC and the Arab Group called for text grounded in national circumstances that leaves policy and technology choices open to countries. Egypt and Kuwait linked this flexibility to national development priorities, industrial structures and resource endowments. The Arab Group opposed language that would rule out particular technologies or set a timetable for their use. |
Carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) | The Arab Group called for industrial just transition to be based on a nationally determined and technology-neutral framework. It explicitly stated that this framework should accommodate carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS). It also named renewable energy and hydrogen. Kuwait raised carbon capture, hydrogen and renewable energy as options shaped by national circumstances. The transcript captures carbon capture. The utilisation and storage wording remains unclear in Kuwait’s intervention. |
1.5°C-aligned*, transitioning away from fossil fuels and *carbon management | An unidentified speaker proposed explicit references to 1.5°C-aligned industrial policies and to transitioning away from fossil fuels in industry in a just, orderly and equitable manner. The speaker used carbon management within a portfolio that also included renewable energy, electrification, green hydrogen, energy and material efficiency, and the circular economy. The scope of carbon management remains unclear. The youth representative called for a stronger link between just transition and the 1.5°C goal and for financing the transition away from fossil fuels. |
False solutions and dangerous distractions | Speaking on behalf of environmental NGOs, Resource Justice Network proposed excluding technologies it described in these terms from just transition technology transfer and development arrangements. The intervention left the technologies covered by that phrase unspecified. |
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) | The transcripts contain no clear proposal to include CDR in the decision text. The phrase discernible in the relevant passage of Egypt’s intervention is equity and CBDR. |
The divergence concerned how open the decision should leave technology choices and how explicitly it should describe the direction of industrial transformation. The Arab Group named CCUS as an example of technology neutrality. Carbon management featured in an intervention that explicitly called for transitioning away from fossil fuels. The environmental NGOs raised a separate question about which options should qualify for support under technology transfer arrangements.
7. Means of implementation, fit-for-purpose finance, enabling environments and technology transfer
Scale, sources and quality of finance. Nigeria fully aligned with the G77 and China. It called for the JTM to provide practical support and said coordination without finance would be insufficient to deliver a just transition. It emphasised both the quantity and quality of finance and cited Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement on developed countries’ obligation to provide financial resources. It said private finance could complement public finance and called for grants and highly concessional finance to reach workers and directly affected communities without increasing public debt. The AGN, Arab Group and LMDC called for stronger international implementation support. Nepal also emphasised grants and highly concessional finance. Japan referred to public finance and the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). Its precise position on language extending beyond the NCQG remains unclear.
What finance should cover. South Africa said that even investment-ready projects can struggle to find finance suited to their needs. It proposed that the JTM help countries prepare requests for support, identify suitable institutions and follow up on applications. It also called for access to grants and concessional finance for community-led and youth-led initiatives. Egypt called for financing project preparation, infrastructure and the early stages of industrial transformation. It identified gaps in financing for retraining, social protection, occupational health and safety, and community support. Brazil called for finance to cover adaptation, resilience and productive infrastructure and for SMEs to have access to concessional finance and guarantees. The Arab Group wanted finance to support employment, local value addition, adaptation and resilience. It opposed tying access to specific standards, indicators or technology choices.
Technology access and domestic capabilities. The Arab Group wanted enabling environments to encompass international financial, technological and market conditions. Egypt said developing countries could not create those conditions on their own. It called for technology transfer to cover equipment, know-how, training, maintenance, local adaptation and research capacity. It identified intellectual property rights and licensing conditions as barriers. Kuwait noted that access depended on the terms on which technology holders were willing to share it. China wanted the key messages to address finance, technology support and capacity-building together. Resource Justice Network called for international cooperation and technology transfer to help countries build productive capabilities and participate in higher-value activities within value chains.
8. Meaningful participation, decent work, social protection, health and rights
Term or proposal | Country, group and observer positions |
Meaningful participation | The EIG linked meaningful participation to the ability of workers and affected groups to influence technology and investment decisions. The Philippines called for workers, women, young people, small businesses and communities to participate in planning, implementation and monitoring. Canada highlighted human and labour rights, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, women’s role in industrial policy and the participation of affected groups from the outset. Panama aligned with the G77 and China and asked who had been included in the process, referring to paragraph 12. The specific amendment it proposed remains unclear. |
Decent work* and *social protection | Kenya emphasised fair wages, safe working conditions and vocational training. Nigeria and Ghana called for support to reach directly affected communities. Ghana and India highlighted social protection for informal workers. Nepal raised migrant workers. An unidentified speaker proposed explicit references to collective bargaining, gender equality and youth participation. |
Health and livelihoods | Ghana proposed aligning industrial, energy, infrastructure, labour and education policies through long-term planning. It called for assessing transition outcomes in terms of occupational health and safety, resilient health systems, livelihoods and access to affordable clean energy. Uruguay emphasised that the health impacts of industrial transformation extend to communities surrounding workplaces. |
Place-based planning* and *multilevel governance | Ukraine supported place-based planning for carbon-intensive industrial communities as well as coal regions. It highlighted impacts on local budgets and public services and saw reconstruction as an opportunity to strengthen climate resilience. The EIG raised multilevel governance. ICLEI wanted coordination between national and local governments reflected in the sixth dialogue’s messages. It cited green industrial clusters, innovation hubs, ethical public procurement, social dialogue and skills development. Another unidentified speaker emphasised bottom-up planning, local entrepreneurship, circularity and local processing capacity. |
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, due diligence and access to remedy | Panama highlighted rights relating to lands and territories, free, prior and informed consent, and meaningful participation by affected communities. The International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change referred to paragraph 12(a) and called for protecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples living in voluntary isolation. It proposed human rights and environmental due diligence, traceability, corporate accountability and access to remedy across mineral value chains. It identified circularity and resource efficiency as ways to reduce pressure for new extraction. Resource Justice Network, speaking on behalf of environmental NGOs, referred to Indigenous Peoples’ right to say no and called for a reference to the UN principles on critical energy transition minerals. |
Distinct rights holders* and *intergenerational equity | The youth representative called for children and young people to be recognised as distinct rights holders, for participation to extend from consultation into decision-making, and for stronger language on intergenerational equity. The representative also supported decent work for workers in both the formal and informal economies and protection of rights across critical mineral value chains. |
Assessment
The proposals on implementation support made the JTM’s possible functions more concrete. The Philippines proposed facilitating access to support. South Africa explained how this could work through help with preparing requests, identifying suitable institutions and following up on applications. Nigeria called for finance to underpin coordination. Egypt identified investment and social costs that existing instruments leave insufficiently covered. Including these functions in the operative provisions would clarify when the mechanism could intervene and whom it could support.
The trade discussion produced concrete proposals for cooperation alongside the disagreement over where to address trade measures. The AGN called for support to help producers meet standards and traceability requirements. South Africa called for developing countries to participate in setting those requirements. Brazil’s proposals on public procurement and SME finance linked demand for low-carbon products to producers’ ability to invest. The draft will show whether parties give these proposals specific language on technical support, finance and participation in standard-setting.
Three drafting choices stand out: how the relationship between the JTWP and the JTM is expressed through terms such as under the JTM, operational arm or complementarity; how far the dialogue messages are reflected in the operative provisions; and the scope and conditions attached to terms such as food systems, technology-neutral, CCUS and transitioning away from fossil fuels. Observer interventions also supplied concrete wording on the role of local governments, accountability in critical mineral value chains and intergenerational equity.
The co-chairs said they aimed to circulate a draft around lunchtime on Friday, 13 November. At the close of the session, it was still unclear whether the schedule would allow the group to reconvene on Friday.
