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COP31 Day 5: Trade, Investment and Joint Action

Throughout COP31, SEFiA is following sessions on the economic and social dimensions of climate policy, with a focus on just transition, climate finance, electrification and industrial decarbonisation. On this page you will find short daily summaries of the key discussions, where countries agree and differ in the negotiations, and developments that matter for Türkiye.

The dialogue addressed the climate finance obligations of developed counties under Articles 9 and 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. The panel arguments focused on how public finance can better respond to the needs of developing countries. Constituencies addressed whether climate finance reaches the countries and communities most in need, the gap between financing commitments and implementation, and the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) deliveries. Key priorities of the session were increasing grant-based and highly concessional finance, improving the predictability and accessibility of resources, and preventing climate investments from exacerbating existing debt burdens. The dialogue also emphasized the success of COP31 should be assessed not only through negotiated agreements but also through the tangible improvements that financing decisions bring to people’s lives.

 

There was broad support for continuing the JTWP beyond 2026. The main questions were how the programme should relate to the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) and how the dialogue messages should inform the decision text and implementation. On industrial transformation, South Africa emphasised matching financial instruments to project needs and enabling developing countries to help shape market rules. Egypt set out which investment and social costs finance should cover and what domestic capabilities technology transfer should build. The areas of convergence below reflect common ground across interventions.

1. Continuation, operational arm, under the JTM and complementarity

Convergence. India and South Africa supported continuing the programme for another three years. Ukraine called for it to continue beyond 2026. Canada wanted to preserve the JTWP’s role in exchanging experience and learning from policy practice as the JTM takes shape, and to make that knowledge useful to policymakers. The United Kingdom supported continuation and the sectoral focus of the dialogues. Egypt aligned with the G77, the African Group and the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) and supported continuation in the absence of an explicit objection.

Term or proposal

Country and group positions

Operational arm

India proposed that the JTWP become the operational arm of the JTM. It called for balanced attention across the programme’s areas of work and cautioned against giving disproportionate weight to particular parties’ priorities.

Under the JTM

The European Union supported continuing the JTWP under the mechanism. The division of responsibilities under this arrangement remained open.

Complementarity

South Africa, Kenya, Bolivia and Japan emphasised complementarity. South Africa wanted the programme to inform the JTM’s work and give greater attention to adaptation, resilience and development pathways. Kenya proposed that the JTM support access to affordable and reliable clean energy, particularly for cooking and heating. Bolivia, aligning with the G77 and China, highlighted implementation, access to adequate and predictable finance, participation by workers and Indigenous Peoples, and coverage of sectors beyond energy.

Separate and mutually reinforcing functions

The Philippines proposed that the JTWP identify challenges and options and that the JTM facilitate access to implementation support within its agreed mandate. It called for voluntary indicators suited to national circumstances to track progress.

Parallel tracks or integration

China referred to three possible arrangements, including the JTWP and JTM proceeding in parallel and the programme being integrated into the mechanism. The third option remains unclear. China left its preference open at this stage.

Review before deciding on continuation

Dominica said that the JTWP could help operationalise the JTM. It called for greater attention to climate resilience and the support needed to build it. It wanted the review to conclude before parties decided on continuation.

Proposals on modalities. The United Kingdom referred to ministerial roundtables alongside the sectoral focus of the dialogues. It also raised hybrid formats, participation by non-Party stakeholders and making dialogue outputs more useful in practice. The details of the roundtable proposal and the full set of five improvements remain unclear. Japan supported retaining existing modalities and updating them where needed. Egypt proposed working with two co-chairs and sharing the secretariat’s workload. Other proposals included retaining all seven elements of the programme’s scope, covering sectors beyond energy, continuing two dialogues per year and maintaining an inclusive, party-driven process. The respective positions of the least developed countries (LDCs) and the EU on these proposals remain unclear. Uruguay, aligning with the G77 and China, referred to a multi-year workplan. The Arab Group called for the review to reflect submissions more evenly, address international cooperation systematically and strengthen outputs while preserving the programme’s scope. The precise scope of its point about the review prejudging the JTM’s mandate remains unclear.

2. Key messages, single compilation and overarching political messages

Convergence. There was support for using both dialogues to inform the decision text. The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) wanted the fifth dialogue’s messages included alongside those of the sixth without weakening them. Uruguay supported a single compilation of key messages from both dialogues. AILAC and AOSIS said they would submit detailed views in writing.

Divergence and proposals. Egypt called for distilling the technical findings into overarching political messages for the decision text. India said that serious concerns remained over some messages from SB64 and that these were still open for negotiation. The AGN wanted the dialogue outputs to inform both the JTWP review and the JTM’s implementation agenda. The Arab Group opposed giving the outputs a prescriptive role in national planning or making them conditions for access to finance.

The drafting question is how to link the dialogue messages’ role in informing the decision to the JTM’s role in facilitating access to implementation support. The Philippines’ proposed wording, facilitate access to implementation support, gives the mechanism a specific function.

3. Food systems, food production systems, food security and water security

Several interventions converged on protecting food security and livelihoods. The differences concerned how to describe the scope of the fifth dialogue and how agricultural value chains should feature in the sixth dialogue’s industrial messages.

Term or proposal

Country, group and observer positions

Food systems

LMDC and India objected to the term. India proposed food production and food security. An unidentified speaker called for retaining food systems, citing previous COP work. ICLEI proposed retaining urban and peri-urban food systems and emphasised the role of local governments in putting national transition objectives into practice in cities and surrounding areas.

Food security*, food production systems and *food production

Uruguay called for using these terms, citing the language of the Paris Agreement. It also wanted the text to recognise small-scale producers, family farmers and rural women.

Water security

An unidentified speaker objected to the term in a national capacity. Brazil emphasised access to water. The landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) highlighted sustainable water and land management, agricultural productivity and approaches suited to national circumstances.

Agro-processing and coastal livelihoods

Uruguay wanted the sixth dialogue’s messages to cover agro-processing alongside mineral processing and manufacturing. South Africa proposed that the fifth dialogue’s messages address producers’ capacity to process goods, trade and capture value in new markets. The AGN and Panama highlighted the role of coastal communities and small-scale fisheries in food security and livelihoods.

Climate-resilient agriculture and agricultural livelihoods

Brazil proposed combining traditional practices with new approaches and providing social protection for small-scale producers, family farmers, fishers and informal workers. Nepal called for protecting food security, livelihoods and irrigation infrastructure from climate impacts and addressing structural barriers faced by women in agriculture.

4. Unilateral trade measures, standards, certification, traceability and shaping markets

Support for addressing impacts under the JTWP. The AGN said that the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) could raise compliance costs and make it harder for small producers to access markets. In its right of reply, it recognised parties’ right to take measures in pursuit of climate objectives. Citing Article 3.5 of the Convention, it called for addressing barriers faced by producers with limited capacity to comply and for providing them with support. The Arab Group said CBAM could adversely affect capital-intensive and hard-to-abate sectors on which developing countries rely. It argued that relevant negotiating forums, including those dealing with trade, complement one another and that the JTWP should also address the just transition impacts of these measures. LMDC and the LLDCs raised compliance costs and barriers to market access. China wanted the key messages to reflect the impacts of unilateral measures.

Divergence over the forum and terminology. The EU said it had adopted binding emissions targets in line with the 1.5°C objective and taken measures to address carbon leakage. It objected to EU policies being singled out and to the characterisation of those policies as unilateral trade measures. It supported discussing trade-related climate measures, including standards, under the Trade and Climate Dialogue. The United Kingdom also pointed to that dialogue for country-specific measures such as CBAM. The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) called for clarity on what the JTWP could contribute alongside other processes dealing with trade and finance.

Proposals on market rules and demand creation. South Africa used shaping markets to argue that developing countries should have a say in the rules and standards governing the markets in which they participate. Uruguay identified trade conditions and the cost of capital as part of the just transition agenda. Uruguay and Kuwait warned that certification and traceability requirements could raise the cost of market entry and referred to Article 3.5 of the Convention. Brazil proposed using public procurement and other demand-side instruments to create markets for low-carbon investment. It linked that proposal to support for locally developed technologies and access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

5. Industrial decarbonisation, right to development, local value addition and climate justice

Development and productive capacity. The AGN, Nigeria and Kenya emphasised local processing, manufacturing and fairer participation in value chains so that developing countries can move beyond exporting raw materials and importing finished technologies. The AGN identified high capital costs, debt, limited technology access and skills gaps as structural barriers. South Africa linked the right to development to equitable access to the economic opportunities created by the transition. It called for investment in local productive capacity and economic opportunities alongside social protection. Egypt proposed that equitable value chains also address how the value created is distributed. The Arab Group identified the right to development and poverty reduction as objectives of industrial transformation. India called for taking account of countries’ stages of development, manufacturing capacity and supply-chain dependencies.

Competitiveness, climate action and clean energy. Canada linked competitive industrial decarbonisation to clean technologies and critical minerals. The United Kingdom emphasised clean energy, energy efficiency, electrification and the circular economy. Nepal wanted clean electricity to support industrialisation in developing countries. Japan said that just transition should advance climate action and highlighted the importance of sectoral transformation for workers. Kenya linked green industrialisation to ecosystem restoration, renewable energy and sustainable agriculture.

Equity language. China called for including climate justice in the key messages and emphasised equity among countries. The Arab Group supported references to equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). Egypt used equity and CBDR in connection with international support and countries’ differentiated responsibilities.

6. Nationally determined, non-prescriptive, technology-neutral, CCUS and carbon management

Term or proposal

Country, group and observer positions

Nationally determined*, non-prescriptive and *technology-neutral

LMDC and the Arab Group called for text grounded in national circumstances that leaves policy and technology choices open to countries. Egypt and Kuwait linked this flexibility to national development priorities, industrial structures and resource endowments. The Arab Group opposed language that would rule out particular technologies or set a timetable for their use.

Carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS)

The Arab Group called for industrial just transition to be based on a nationally determined and technology-neutral framework. It explicitly stated that this framework should accommodate carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS). It also named renewable energy and hydrogen. Kuwait raised carbon capture, hydrogen and renewable energy as options shaped by national circumstances. The transcript captures carbon capture. The utilisation and storage wording remains unclear in Kuwait’s intervention.

1.5°C-aligned*, transitioning away from fossil fuels and *carbon management

An unidentified speaker proposed explicit references to 1.5°C-aligned industrial policies and to transitioning away from fossil fuels in industry in a just, orderly and equitable manner. The speaker used carbon management within a portfolio that also included renewable energy, electrification, green hydrogen, energy and material efficiency, and the circular economy. The scope of carbon management remains unclear. The youth representative called for a stronger link between just transition and the 1.5°C goal and for financing the transition away from fossil fuels.

False solutions and dangerous distractions

Speaking on behalf of environmental NGOs, Resource Justice Network proposed excluding technologies it described in these terms from just transition technology transfer and development arrangements. The intervention left the technologies covered by that phrase unspecified.

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR)

The transcripts contain no clear proposal to include CDR in the decision text. The phrase discernible in the relevant passage of Egypt’s intervention is equity and CBDR.

The divergence concerned how open the decision should leave technology choices and how explicitly it should describe the direction of industrial transformation. The Arab Group named CCUS as an example of technology neutrality. Carbon management featured in an intervention that explicitly called for transitioning away from fossil fuels. The environmental NGOs raised a separate question about which options should qualify for support under technology transfer arrangements.

7. Means of implementation, fit-for-purpose finance, enabling environments and technology transfer

Scale, sources and quality of finance. Nigeria fully aligned with the G77 and China. It called for the JTM to provide practical support and said coordination without finance would be insufficient to deliver a just transition. It emphasised both the quantity and quality of finance and cited Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement on developed countries’ obligation to provide financial resources. It said private finance could complement public finance and called for grants and highly concessional finance to reach workers and directly affected communities without increasing public debt. The AGN, Arab Group and LMDC called for stronger international implementation support. Nepal also emphasised grants and highly concessional finance. Japan referred to public finance and the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). Its precise position on language extending beyond the NCQG remains unclear.

What finance should cover. South Africa said that even investment-ready projects can struggle to find finance suited to their needs. It proposed that the JTM help countries prepare requests for support, identify suitable institutions and follow up on applications. It also called for access to grants and concessional finance for community-led and youth-led initiatives. Egypt called for financing project preparation, infrastructure and the early stages of industrial transformation. It identified gaps in financing for retraining, social protection, occupational health and safety, and community support. Brazil called for finance to cover adaptation, resilience and productive infrastructure and for SMEs to have access to concessional finance and guarantees. The Arab Group wanted finance to support employment, local value addition, adaptation and resilience. It opposed tying access to specific standards, indicators or technology choices.

Technology access and domestic capabilities. The Arab Group wanted enabling environments to encompass international financial, technological and market conditions. Egypt said developing countries could not create those conditions on their own. It called for technology transfer to cover equipment, know-how, training, maintenance, local adaptation and research capacity. It identified intellectual property rights and licensing conditions as barriers. Kuwait noted that access depended on the terms on which technology holders were willing to share it. China wanted the key messages to address finance, technology support and capacity-building together. Resource Justice Network called for international cooperation and technology transfer to help countries build productive capabilities and participate in higher-value activities within value chains.

8. Meaningful participation, decent work, social protection, health and rights

Term or proposal

Country, group and observer positions

Meaningful participation

The EIG linked meaningful participation to the ability of workers and affected groups to influence technology and investment decisions. The Philippines called for workers, women, young people, small businesses and communities to participate in planning, implementation and monitoring. Canada highlighted human and labour rights, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, women’s role in industrial policy and the participation of affected groups from the outset. Panama aligned with the G77 and China and asked who had been included in the process, referring to paragraph 12. The specific amendment it proposed remains unclear.

Decent work* and *social protection

Kenya emphasised fair wages, safe working conditions and vocational training. Nigeria and Ghana called for support to reach directly affected communities. Ghana and India highlighted social protection for informal workers. Nepal raised migrant workers. An unidentified speaker proposed explicit references to collective bargaining, gender equality and youth participation.

Health and livelihoods

Ghana proposed aligning industrial, energy, infrastructure, labour and education policies through long-term planning. It called for assessing transition outcomes in terms of occupational health and safety, resilient health systems, livelihoods and access to affordable clean energy. Uruguay emphasised that the health impacts of industrial transformation extend to communities surrounding workplaces.

Place-based planning* and *multilevel governance

Ukraine supported place-based planning for carbon-intensive industrial communities as well as coal regions. It highlighted impacts on local budgets and public services and saw reconstruction as an opportunity to strengthen climate resilience. The EIG raised multilevel governance. ICLEI wanted coordination between national and local governments reflected in the sixth dialogue’s messages. It cited green industrial clusters, innovation hubs, ethical public procurement, social dialogue and skills development. Another unidentified speaker emphasised bottom-up planning, local entrepreneurship, circularity and local processing capacity.

Rights of Indigenous Peoples, due diligence and access to remedy

Panama highlighted rights relating to lands and territories, free, prior and informed consent, and meaningful participation by affected communities. The International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change referred to paragraph 12(a) and called for protecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples living in voluntary isolation. It proposed human rights and environmental due diligence, traceability, corporate accountability and access to remedy across mineral value chains. It identified circularity and resource efficiency as ways to reduce pressure for new extraction. Resource Justice Network, speaking on behalf of environmental NGOs, referred to Indigenous Peoples’ right to say no and called for a reference to the UN principles on critical energy transition minerals.

Distinct rights holders* and *intergenerational equity

The youth representative called for children and young people to be recognised as distinct rights holders, for participation to extend from consultation into decision-making, and for stronger language on intergenerational equity. The representative also supported decent work for workers in both the formal and informal economies and protection of rights across critical mineral value chains.

Assessment

The proposals on implementation support made the JTM’s possible functions more concrete. The Philippines proposed facilitating access to support. South Africa explained how this could work through help with preparing requests, identifying suitable institutions and following up on applications. Nigeria called for finance to underpin coordination. Egypt identified investment and social costs that existing instruments leave insufficiently covered.

Including these functions in the operative provisions would clarify when the mechanism could intervene and whom it could support.

The trade discussion produced concrete proposals for cooperation alongside the disagreement over where to address trade measures. The AGN called for support to help producers meet standards and traceability requirements. South Africa called for developing countries to participate in setting those requirements. Brazil’s proposals on public procurement and SME finance linked demand for low-carbon products to producers’ ability to invest. The draft will show whether parties give these proposals specific language on technical support, finance and participation in standard-setting.

Three drafting choices stand out: how the relationship between the JTWP and the JTM is expressed through terms such as under the JTM, operational arm or complementarity; how far the dialogue messages are reflected in the operative provisions; and the scope and conditions attached to terms such as food systems, technology-neutral, CCUS and transitioning away from fossil fuels. Observer interventions also supplied concrete wording on the role of local governments, accountability in critical mineral value chains and intergenerational equity.

The co-chairs said they aimed to circulate a draft around lunchtime on Friday, 13 November. At the close of the session, it was still unclear whether the schedule would allow the group to reconvene on Friday.

The session examined how to translate international commitments on adaptation and loss and damage into concrete action while ensuring that finance reaches vulnerable communities directly. A potential small-grants access window under the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) emerged as an option for improving community-level access, subject to further consideration by the Fund’s Board. The growing gap between financing needs and available resources, reliance on intermediaries and the long-term sustainability of climate funds remained major concerns. The session highlighted the need for stronger coordination across loss and damage mechanisms, financing for non-economic losses such as cultural heritage, and meaningful decision-making roles for children and young people in adaptation indicators, financing arrangements and monitoring processes. Constituencies also called for early discussions on replenishing the grant component of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage ahead of the next Board deliberations in line with the growing pressure of climate-related disasters on available resources.

The session reviewed COP31 negotiations through a gender equality and feminist climate justice lens, examining the links between climate finance, fossil fuel phase-out, geopolitical conflicts and participation in decision-making. Discussions called for implementing the Belém Gender Action Plan, ending fossil fuel expansion and ensuring that climate finance reaches women and grassroots communities directly. Participants also emphasized gender-responsive data and transparent monitoring systems that track not only financial commitments but also who receives resources and benefits from climate investments. Rather than financing models that transfer climate-related costs to vulnerable communities through additional debt, the session advocated a reparative justice approach that recognises historical responsibility. Conflict, displacement, military-related emissions and increasing unpaid care responsibilities highlighted the need to address peacebuilding and climate resilience together. The discussion prioritised meaningful decision-making power for women and marginalised groups, extending beyond consultation to direct influence over climate policies and financing decisions.

The dialogue reviewed progress towards the annual USD 100 billion climate finance goal through the Standing Committee on Finance’s (SCF) third progress report and examined priorities for delivering the new target of at least USD 300 billion annually by 2035 and the broader USD 1.3 trillion mobilization ambition. According to OECD data presented in the report, climate finance reached approximately USD 136.7 billion in 2024, while Oxfam’s estimates of grant and grant-equivalent finance, calculated using a different methodology, ranged from USD 32.7 billion to USD 44.7 billion, highlighting the distinction between the volume and quality of climate finance and the need for common accounting methodologies. Discussions showed that despite increasing financial flows, high borrowing costs, complex application procedures, lengthy approval processes, and mismatches between financing allocations and the needs of vulnerable countries continue to constrain implementation. The discussion emphasized the need to break the cycle of climate disasters, rising debt burdens, and high capital costs by moving beyond individual project financing toward strengthening national institutions, improving investment conditions, and supporting long-term economic transformation. Key demands included expanding grant-based and concessional finance, tripling adaptation finance, protecting debt sustainability and improving transparent reporting. The session also highlighted the role of multilateral development banks in harmonizing financing instruments and procedures, mobilizing private capital through guarantees and risk-sharing mechanisms, and translating national climate plans into investment-ready project portfolios. The dialogue also featured announcements of additional climate finance packages proposed jointly by several climate finance provider countries.

The session examined the implications of a just transition beyond emissions reductions and green job creation, focusing on households, care services, social protection and gender equality. A just transition must ensure that all segments of society can benefit equally from the green transformation. Women and girls perform about three times as much unpaid care and domestic work as men globally, highlighting the need to invest in the care economy and social infrastructure to prevent green transformation from reinforcing existing inequalities. Discussions addressed expanding childcare services, strengthening social protection systems, and removing structural barriers that limit women’s access to emerging economic opportunities. Effective implementation requires institutional coordination across climate, employment, social protection and gender equality policies, supported by shared indicators, gender-responsive budget tagging and regular monitoring. The session also emphasised evidence-based policymaking that combines climate science with assessments of social vulnerability, disaggregated data and access to future economic opportunities. Meaningful decision-making authority for women and affected communities, extending beyond consultation to influence over policy priorities, budgeting and implementation, emerged as a central condition for inclusive just transition governance.

The session focused on financing instruments and cooperation models that multilateral development banks (MDBs) can use to address climate finance needs in developing countries and translate international commitments into concrete investments. In the technical panel discussions, experts from multilateral development banks addressed the role of policy-based lending, guarantees, risk-sharing arrangements, and concessional finance in mobilizing private capital. A mutual message highlighted the need to develop bankable markets, rather than focusing solely on individual bankable projects, to attract private investment. The Global Green Bond Initiative provided an example of mobilising private capital through coordinated public and concessional financing support. The Adaptation Benefits Mechanism, expected to enter into implementation, emerged as an approach that aims to improve the financial viability of adaptation projects by creating additional revenue streams, although it has not yet generated financing at the intended scale. Under Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement, which addresses non-market approaches, the discussion also explored how government policies requiring emitters to contribute towards adaptation costs could create a new source of demand and revenue for adaptation projects.

The session examined the implementation approach and partnerships of Climate Implementation BRIDGE, an initiative designed to turn countries’ climate and development priorities into projects that can secure financing. BRIDGE was presented as a coordination structure connecting country-led priorities with existing sources of finance, technical expertise and implementation partners. Limited institutional capacity, gaps in project preparation and difficulties accessing finance were identified as major barriers to translating commitments into investment, particularly in developing countries. Türkiye announced a USD 3 million contribution to the initiative and the establishment of its steering committee. Participants emphasised the importance of sustaining BRIDGE beyond COP31 and working through existing international partnerships.

Country interventions illustrated how the initiative could respond to different national and regional needs. Uzbekistan called for matching Nationally Determined Contribution priorities with identified funding sources, aligning partners around shared priorities and supporting regional programmes addressing transboundary water, land and climate risks in Central Asia. Fiji highlighted electrification and the initiative’s continuity, while Zambia stressed the need to strengthen project preparation capacity and scale up investment. UNDP emphasised strong institutions and country ownership grounded in local knowledge. Contributions from development banks and other partners focused on project readiness, appropriate financial instruments and risk sharing. Discussions highlighted the importance of tracking how the finance mobilised translates into tangible improvements in employment, livelihoods, resilience and people’s living conditions.

The session explored how trade finance, development finance and private capital can work together to support the low-carbon transition. Discussions addressed the mobilisation of resources alongside businesses’ ability to access those resources and use them for transition investments. Participants highlighted the barriers facing SMEs in developing countries, including limited capital, weak project preparation capacity and gaps in the skills needed to adopt new technologies. Türk Eximbank described the role of cooperation with multilateral development banks in providing concessional finance. Uganda Development Bank shared an approach combining the supply of finance with enterprise development support and demand generation. The International Trade Centre (ITC) presented a pilot facility bringing together technical assistance for SMEs and investors, concessional finance and additional private capital. Examples presented in relation to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) highlighted expanding access through existing financial systems and testing local-currency lending.

Participants stressed that climate ambition can create demand for clean technologies, supported by infrastructure investment and coordination between national and local authorities. Proposals for scaling up investment included developing pipelines of financeable projects, improving the alignment between market demand and financial instruments, and using blended finance approaches. The youth representative drew attention to debt burdens, barriers to accessing climate finance and the need to give greater weight to the circumstances of vulnerable countries. From a just transition perspective, a central message was to assess finance by how effectively it reaches businesses and communities, supports access to technology and delivers results on the ground.

The session examined how the standards, carbon accounting methodologies and verification arrangements underpinning different climate policies can work together. Türkiye’s representative warned that the proliferation of measures similar to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) could require exporters to undergo repeated certification processes across markets. The discussion therefore addressed businesses’ ability to comply with regulations alongside the relationships between different regulatory systems. The OECD highlighted the risk of fragmentation arising from different approaches to calculating carbon intensity and stressed that interoperability extends beyond metrics to verification arrangements and the ability to use results across systems. ISO described international standards as a common language that helps translate climate ambition into implementation. ResponsibleSteel shared sectoral experience concerning transparency in steel carbon intensity calculations and cooperation between standards.

An intervention on carbon markets considered how policy alignment could strengthen demand and support emissions reductions. Pakistan’s representative highlighted the challenges that climate-related trade requirements can pose for agriculture- and textile-dependent economies and SMEs, calling for countries to have sufficient time to adjust. Discussions pointed to the importance of clearly demonstrating the environmental effects of regulations, reducing repeated certification requirements and accounting for differences in implementation capacity. From a just transition perspective, a central concern was to preserve market access and participation in the transition for developing-country producers and SMEs as standards and verification systems become more interoperable.