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COP31 Week 2, Day 1: Climate Action and Just Transition Mechanism

Throughout COP31, SEFiA is following sessions on the economic and social dimensions of climate policy, with a focus on just transition, climate finance, electrification and industrial decarbonisation. On this page you will find short daily summaries of the key discussions, where countries agree and differ in the negotiations, and developments that matter for Türkiye.

As COP31 enters its second week, a full consensus has yet to be reached on the institutional structure, implementation, and financing functions of the Belém-Antalya Just Transition Mechanism (BAM). The Presidency-led, Party-driven Cover Decision text presented today, on 16 November, provides a broad basis for consensus across different negotiation areas. The text brings together proposals reflecting the priorities of different negotiating groups, including accelerating the phase-out of fossil fuels, the role of carbon capture technologies, and unilateral climate-related trade measures. Strengthening BAM through functions that facilitate technical assistance, capacity-building, and access to finance could strengthen developing countries’ capacity to implement just transition policies. In this regard, clarifying the mechanism’s relationship with existing financing structures, institutional responsibilities, and implementation processes will be particularly important.

The outcomes from Antalya will show how emission reductions can be accelerated in line with the 1.5°C goal and the extent to which concrete financing and implementation mechanisms will support just transition efforts. 

At the 16 November roundtable, the broadest convergence was around the idea that the mechanism agreed in Belém should help countries implement their own just transition pathways. In closing, the co-chair highlighted three points. The mechanism should be non-prescriptive, Party-driven and responsive to national circumstances. How those principles would work in practice remained open. The main differences concerned what support the mechanism would provide, how it would relate to the work programme and how the 1.5°C goal would be reflected in its mandate. 

Issue

Convergence

Divergence

Moving from dialogue to implementation

A wide range of speakers called for practical support through technical assistance, capacity-building, knowledge-sharing and international cooperation. Many stressed the need to match country needs with available support and coordinate with existing initiatives.

Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom emphasised making better use of existing institutions and instruments. Brazil called for resource mobilisation, the African Group sought an explicit mandate to facilitate access to finance, and the Philippines called for new and additional resources. Proposals ranged from improving access to existing support to mobilising resources for unmet needs.

Governance and institutional design

Many interventions envisaged a mechanism operating under the authority and guidance of the CMA. Several proposals assigned distinct functions to policy guidance and technical support.

AOSIS and CARICOM proposed two tiers with dedicated representation for small island developing States. The African Group called for a formally constituted steering committee and a dedicated implementation unit with core funding. Brazil supported a dedicated operational unit, while Indonesia proposed a three-component structure. Japan favoured starting with existing instruments, and Germany proposed defining the institutional form once the functions were clear.

Future of the JTWP

Speakers widely recognised the value of continuing the dialogues, peer learning and exchange of experience. Many expected the dialogues to inform implementation.

Canada and Japan proposed bringing the dialogues or the work programme’s modalities into the mechanism. The EU and Germany also supported incorporating existing dialogue formats. The UAE, the landlocked developing countries and The Gambia called for the work programme to remain distinct and complementary and to be extended for three years. Pakistan proposed placing the mechanism under the umbrella of the work programme. Brazil proposed continuing the programme until the mechanism was fully operational.

Finance and debt

The least developed countries, the African Group, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries stressed that technical advice needed to be backed by implementation finance that would avoid deepening debt burdens. Vanuatu illustrated the gap with its experience of designing a national loss and damage programme with support from the Santiago Network and then being unable to finance its implementation.

The African Group called for an explicit just transition financing framework and a mandate to facilitate access to grants and highly concessional finance. The Philippines called for adequate, new, additional and predictable finance. Tonga stressed grants over commercial loans. The EU, Japan and the United Kingdom focused on connecting existing initiatives, expertise and support channels. Their interventions did not establish an explicit position against new finance.

Participation and rights

A range of countries and observer constituencies stressed the importance of involving workers and affected communities. Social dialogue, human rights, labour rights and gender equality featured in many interventions.

Panama, speaking for AILAC, called for observer participation in both tiers. Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations sought a dedicated seat on the governing body. Trade unions called for workers to be at the table when decisions affecting them are made. YOUNGO wanted participation to extend beyond consultation to design and governance. The form of representation and role in decision-making within a Party-driven structure remained open.

Operationalisation timetable

There was strong support for a concrete decision on the mechanism in Antalya.

The African Group wanted a decision at CMA 8 and a fully operational mechanism by CMA 9 in Addis Ababa. AOSIS proposed settling the steering committee and hosting arrangements by SB 66 and making the mechanism fully operational by COP32. CARICOM also called for full operationalisation by COP32. Morocco proposed settling institutional arrangements in 2027 and starting technical support in 2028. Interventions distinguished between adopting the decision, setting up the institutions and starting to deliver support to countries.

 

1.5°C, fossil fuels and the Global Stocktake

Speakers who referred to 1.5°C assigned the goal different roles in the design of the mechanism. Murat Kurum called for a shared political commitment in Antalya to both the 1.5°C goal and just transition. AOSIS, Tonga and Fiji called for just transition pathways aligned with 1.5°C. Tonga and Kiribati linked the goal to the survival of island States. Sudan and Nepal warned that every increment of warming erodes development gains and increases risks for vulnerable communities. YOUNGO called for limiting any temperature overshoot and rapidly returning to 1.5°C if an overshoot occurs, framing this as a matter of intergenerational equity. The EU, Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom presented just transition as a way to accelerate climate action consistent with 1.5°C.

Differences became clearer when speakers addressed how the temperature goal should inform sectoral guidance and the implementation of Global Stocktake outcomes. Vanuatu, speaking for Pacific small island developing States, called for implementing the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake (GST) and transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner. The EU and Germany also explicitly called for a transition away from fossil fuels. Saudi Arabia, speaking for the Arab Group, used the Paris Agreement formulation of holding warming well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. In the same intervention, it opposed guidance targeting specific sectors and the use of the JTWP to turn particular GST outcomes into benchmarks for national policy. Iraq said it would not accept language calling for a collective transition away from fossil fuels. Oman opposed prescribing particular sectors, technologies or transition speeds. Venezuela stressed the potential effects of an externally imposed fossil fuel phase-out timetable on employment and food security.

The direction of the link with the GST also mattered. AOSIS and China spoke of lessons from just transition work informing the second GST. Vanuatu called for implementing the outcomes of the first GST. The Arab Group opposed giving the work programme a mandate to translate specific GST outcomes into expectations for national policy. These positions leave open what mandate a reference to the GST would give the mechanism.

Production, trade and development policy space

Local value addition and economic diversification came up in several concrete interventions. The African Group said Africa supplies agricultural products and minerals needed for the global transition and argued that a just transition should enable the continent to process those inputs and manufacture finished products. Botswana, on behalf of landlocked developing countries, included productive capacity and participation in value chains in the scope of just transition. Bhutan said it could produce low-carbon steel using renewable electricity but could still face barriers to market access because of the trade effects of climate policies. Colombia highlighted the importance of fossil fuel revenues to its economy and public finances, the effects of transition on jobs and growth, and Article 4.8 of the Convention.

These interventions converged on the point that trade and development conditions affect what countries can implement. The mechanism’s mandate in this area was less clear. The African Group, the Arab Group, Oman and Tonga raised the effects of unilateral trade measures. BINGO called for better coordination between trade rules and climate objectives. An open question was whether trade impacts would be addressed through dialogue or whether the mechanism would be given an explicit role in helping countries respond to them.

The main institutional differences concerned whether the JTWP and the mechanism would remain separate, which would sit under the other if integrated, and what mandate the mechanism would have on finance. The main political difference concerned how far alignment with 1.5°C would be reflected in the mechanism’s mandate through language on transitioning away from fossil fuels and links to the GST. The co-chair identified common ground on national circumstances and Party leadership. The scope of support, the authority to deliver it and the timetable remained open at the close of the roundtable.

The session focused on translating the first Global Stocktake (GST1) outcomes into concrete investments and strengthening transparency in non-state climate action. The updated NAZCA portal, integrated with the ISS reporting system, aims to track annual progress of cooperative initiatives and generate comparable data for the second Global Stocktake (GST2). On financing, 57 subnational development banks across Latin America and Africa reported approximately USD 308 million in financing reaching 563 cities. Strengthening these institutions through country platforms and mechanisms linked to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) was identified as a priority for local investment. The Industry Transition Accelerator announced that it had exceeded its target of 50 final investment decisions between COP29 and COP31, reaching 66, alongside the launch of its Türkiye program under TIDIP on 16 November. With over 800 clean industrial projects globally, six acceleration priorities emerged: clean energy supply, demand creation, supply chain coordination, community engagement, investment de-risking and trade partnerships. Green public procurement and Contracts for Difference were highlighted as instruments supporting investment. The Net-zero Recognition Framework also introduced a five-level system tracking progress from commitments to achievement, strengthening accountability through emissions and value chain reporting.

The session examined expectations for the second week of COP31 negotiations, focusing on transitioning away from fossil fuels, scaling climate finance and linking negotiation outcomes to the second Global Stocktake (GST2). Discussions highlighted the widening gap between scientific urgency and political progress, along with rising risks of global temperature overshoot and severe climate impacts. The Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD 1.3 trillion was identified as requiring concrete financing instruments and changes to existing approaches. Applying the polluter-pays principle through levies on private aviation and other high-emission activities was proposed to mobilize additional, debt-free finance for vulnerable countries, including support for anticipatory action. Regarding fossil fuels, formal recognition of the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels (TAFF) Roadmap in COP31 decisions was considered a meaningful political achievement, following calls from more than 80 countries. Linking Brazil’s roadmap to GST2 was highlighted as essential for maintaining momentum in future negotiations. Efforts to halt deforestation and deliver the USD 1.3 trillion finance objective were identified as complementary priorities. Discussions also stressed that the 35-by-35 electrification target must be supported by clean electricity generation. Overall, COP31 outcomes were expected to shape debates on emissions responsibility, financing obligations, and the implementation agenda leading towards GST2.

The session focused on the governance, financing and implementation arrangements required to operationalise the Belém-Antalya Just Transition Mechanism (BAM) under the UAE Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP). Expected to be a major COP31 outcome, the mechanism was presented as a means of supporting nationally determined transition pathways through technical assistance, capacity-building, technology transfer and access to finance. Stronger coordination among existing UNFCCC institutions and financing arrangements was emphasised to avoid duplication and additional reporting burdens. Governance proposals included advisory and steering committees, dedicated technical assistance teams, a five-year work plan and a potential review in 2029. Observer constituencies called for institutionalised participation by workers, women, youth, Indigenous Peoples and local governments. Accessible, grant-based and non-debt-creating finance emerged as a priority, while balancing national flexibility with human rights, labour standards and climate ambition remained a key negotiating issue. Discussions also highlighted agriculture, energy access and climate resilience as important dimensions of just transition. The future structure of the JTWP and its relationship with BAM require further clarification. Overall, the roundtable underscored that the mechanism’s effectiveness will depend on delivering coordinated, accessible and accountable implementation support that generates tangible benefits for affected communities and developing countries.