Throughout COP31, SEFiA is following sessions on the economic and social dimensions of climate policy, with a focus on just transition, climate finance, electrification and industrial decarbonisation. On this page you will find short daily summaries of the key discussions, where countries agree and differ in the negotiations, and developments that matter for Türkiye.
Brazil’s COP30 Presidency presented its roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner at COP31 in Antalya on 10 November. First unveiled in Brasília on 3 November, the document focuses on how to put into practice the call to transition away from fossil fuels in the first Global Stocktake (GST), adopted at COP28 in Dubai. Brazil developed the roadmap as a voluntary Presidency initiative outside the formal negotiations.
Speaking at the presentation in Antalya, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stressed that dependence on fossil fuels drives climate change and exposes economies to price shocks and energy security risks. The roadmap considers the transition alongside development, access to energy and protection for workers and affected communities.
What does the roadmap propose?
- The Belém Readiness Approach. The roadmap proposes that countries assess their dependence on fossil fuels and their capacity to manage the transition across three dimensions covering energy demand, energy supply and the wider economy. The indicators are intended to help countries assess their starting conditions and identify where they can act early.
- A shared implementation agenda through 2033. The initiative, known as the TAFF Mutirão, aims to accelerate collective action across three overlapping phases. The first prioritises national planning, coordination across institutions, reforming fossil fuel incentives while protecting vulnerable consumers and reducing methane emissions. The second focuses on scaling up clean energy, electrification, energy efficiency, grids and storage. The final phase focuses on adapting and diversifying energy supply as demand changes. The proposed joint agenda runs through 2033.
- International cooperation and follow-up. Brazil proposes that future COP presidencies continue the dialogue on implementation and use it to review progress and discuss shared barriers ahead of the second Global Stocktake (GST2) in 2028.
Assessment
- The roadmap’s most concrete contribution is that it examines fossil fuel dependence across the wider economy. Considering supply, demand and the wider economy together shows why a country reliant on fossil fuel imports will have different priorities from one that depends on fossil fuel production for public revenue and employment. For Türkiye, the framework offers a way to consider potential savings on imported fuels alongside employment and economic diversification needs in regions that depend on domestic coal.
- The impact of electrification depends on how additional electricity demand is met. This is the clearest link between COP31’s electrification agenda and the TAFF roadmap. Assessing how much electrification can reduce fossil fuel use requires tracking growth in electricity consumption, changes in the power generation mix and changes in coal and gas use together. That link also explains why investment in grids and storage is part of the transition away from fossil fuels.
- A just transition depends on linking needs assessments to funding decisions. Protecting workers, communities and vulnerable consumers is among the roadmap’s guiding principles. Putting those principles into practice means determining how much support each region needs, which measures to fund and who will receive support. When reforming fossil fuel incentives, for example, changes in household energy costs should be tracked alongside access to compensatory support. In regional planning, accounting for indirect effects on informal workers and women could change funding priorities.
- The impact of the voluntary framework depends on national plans and how progress is tracked. Giving countries flexibility to act according to their own circumstances can help them move from planning to implementation from different starting points. For GST2, the main test will be whether that flexibility translates into national measures with clear timelines, designated institutions and identified funding, and whether those measures lead to measurable reductions in fossil fuel use.
The broadest agreement at the 10 November session was that the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) should help countries implement their own transition priorities and facilitate access to existing support. The main differences concerned how the mechanism would provide that support, how far its financing role would extend and how it would relate to the existing work programme.
Areas of agreement and convergence
- Moving from dialogue to implementation. The EU, the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Arab Group placed varying emphasis on technical assistance, sharing expertise, identifying needs and gaps, and facilitating international cooperation. The UK’s proposal for an expert network fits within this approach.
- Reflecting national, regional and sectoral circumstances. The EIG emphasised nationally determined just transition pathways and roadmaps. AOSIS called for flexibility to reflect different national circumstances. Azerbaijan stressed the need to account for differing regional needs, while Brazil called for the mechanism’s design to reflect differences across sectors and economies.
- Linking political guidance and technical implementation. Panama, Brazil, AOSIS and Ecuador supported a two-tier structure. The LDCs described distinct governance and technical functions. The EU called for political guidance and implementation to reinforce each other. Which bodies would carry out these functions and what authority they would have remain open.
- Drawing on existing institutions and resources. The EU called for systematic use of existing mandates and capacities. Japan emphasised drawing on existing mechanisms and initiatives, while Canada focused on coordinating existing resources and improving coherence across initiatives. The EIG and the Arab Group also highlighted the mechanism’s role in facilitating access to support.
Main areas of divergence
- Financing mandate. The EIG opposes establishing the JTM as a fund and supports a role in facilitating access to existing finance. The Arab Group also proposes a network that facilitates access to finance. South Africa wants the mechanism to strengthen accountability for existing just transition finance and take a stronger role in addressing the quantity and quality of finance. The session notes leave open whether South Africa proposed creating a new fund or mobilising new sources of finance.
- Future of the work programme and timelines. Panama proposes continuing the existing work programme for up to two years while the JTM becomes operational. Norway proposes recognising the work programme under the JTM and establishing a framework through the end of 2036, with an initial five-year term and a five-year renewal period. The EU’s five-year proposal concerns the duration of the work plan. AOSIS wants the JTM to become operational at this session.
- Decision-making authority and governance. Panama and AOSIS emphasise that the mechanism should operate under CMA guidance. Egypt stresses that the mechanism should be Party-driven, while AOSIS proposes a steering or advisory committee and civil society participation. Norway proposes that two co-chairs lead the dialogues, one from a developed country and one from a developing country. How decision-making authority would be distributed and at which stages stakeholders would participate remain open.
- Scope of the mandate. Japan proposes a streamlined structure that draws on existing mechanisms. Canada focuses on coordinating existing resources and improving coherence across initiatives. China also raises the need to prevent development gaps from widening, coordinate trade rules and strengthen economic and industrial cooperation. The EU calls for just transition considerations to be integrated into the Global Stocktake (GST) and into national and sectoral roadmaps.
No explicit disagreement emerged among countries on participation. Interventions focused on different groups and functions. The EIG emphasised gender and intergenerational equity, the LDCs highlighted workers in formal and informal employment, and AOSIS and Burkina Faso stressed local community participation. Peru called for the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples living in voluntary isolation. How these priorities will be reflected in arrangements for representation, consultation and technical support remains open.
The Global Electrification Ministerial and Forum took place at COP31, co-hosted by the COP31 Presidency and the European Union. Representatives from Türkiye, Australia, the IEA, IRENA and the OECD delivered opening remarks, after which countries shared their perspectives on electrification.
The discussion centred on a proposal to raise electricity’s share of global final energy consumption from 23 per cent today to 35 per cent by 2035. According to an IEA report commissioned by Türkiye and Australia, electricity could cost-effectively meet 33 per cent of global final energy consumption by 2035 using existing technologies and even at pre-Hormuz crisis energy prices. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has renewed attention to electrification’s potential to reduce dependence on imported fuels across sectors from transport to industry.
The Forum will continue to convene regularly after COP31. As part of the same initiative, the IEA will lead the Global Electrification Tracking Mechanism, which will monitor the pace of electrification globally and across regions.
The discussion examined how climate change affects women and girls through income loss, food and water insecurity, increased unpaid care responsibilities and greater risks of gender-based violence. Analyses presented at the event suggested that without policies to advance gender equality, women could secure fewer than 2 per cent of new green jobs. Investment in care services, social protection and skills development could create around 68 million additional employment opportunities by 2035.
Participants proposed treating the care economy and social protection services as part of climate infrastructure and introducing gender-responsive budgeting and monitoring mechanisms in national climate policies. They also examined how climate finance models affect gender equality, noting that around 70 per cent of climate finance provided to developing countries takes the form of loans and that debt servicing limits the resources available for essential public services.
The discussion examined the links between the climate crisis, conflict and economic inequality through the allocation of public resources and the social and environmental impacts of the current economic system. Participants proposed redirecting public funds from military spending towards climate action, adaptation and just transition investments. They also discussed how the economic benefits of fossil fuel and mining activities are distributed and how local workers and communities bear a disproportionate share of the social and environmental costs.
Participants highlighted the risk that the green transition could reproduce existing economic relations based on resource extraction. They called for transition policies that reduce economic inequalities, protect the rights of local communities and strengthen international cooperation.

