

A person wearing a yellow shirt and a bucket hat stands with their back to the camera, holding a green and black bicycle. They are in a field of tall, dry grass. In the background, there is a large solar panel farm with rows of panels tilted towards the sun. Further back, several wind turbines are visible on a hill under a blue sky with some clouds. A large white curved graphic element is on the right side of the image.

Progressing the Transition Away From Fossil Fuels: Lessons from case studies

IISD REPORT



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Progressing the Transition Away From Fossil Fuels: Lessons from case studies

March 2026

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Photo: Bicyclist looking at wind turbines and solar farm in Spain/iStock

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Felipe Corral (Centro POLEN Transiciones Justas), Jason Rosario Braganza, Suzana Kahn (UFRJ), Jonas Kuehl (IISD), Lahra Liberti (OECD), Bathandwa Vazi (IISD), and David Waskow (WRI) for their thoughtful comments on this publication.

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1.0 Introduction

As the global commitment to transition away from fossil fuels moves from ambition-setting to delivery, policy-makers are increasingly confronted with the practical challenge of how to plan and implement this transition across diverse political, economic, and institutional contexts. While the need for a just, orderly, and equitable transition is widely recognized, there is no single blueprint for operationalizing this objective. Instead, progress is emerging through a growing set of national initiatives, international partnerships, and sectoral processes that—taken together—offer valuable lessons for designing and implementing transition away from fossil fuels (TAFF) roadmaps and plans.

This paper presents a curated set of case studies illustrating how different actors are already addressing key dimensions of TAFF planning and implementation, as well as key gaps and lessons learned from these processes. It accompanies the paper *Progressing the Transition Away From Fossil Fuels: A guide for policy-makers working on TAFF roadmaps and plans*, which sets out the core principles and elements that should guide TAFF roadmaps. The case studies provide concrete examples of how these principles are being applied, tested, or, in some cases, inadequately addressed in practice.

The cases span multiple levels of governance and types of intervention, including national roadmap processes (such as in Colombia, Türkiye, and Brazil), international coordination mechanisms (such as methane abatement partnerships and Just Energy Transition Partnerships [JTEPs]), first-mover alliances focused on specific fuels or policy levers, and structured national processes for negotiating fossil fuel phase-outs in politically sensitive sectors and regions. The first three cases refer to national experiences, while the last three refer to different types of international ones. Together, they reflect the reality that the transition away from fossil fuels is unfolding unevenly through a patchwork of sectoral, national, and international efforts, often shaped as much by geopolitics, trade, and economic pressures as by climate commitments.

Each case study is presented using a common framework: outlining the context and rationale for inclusion; assessing relevant TAFF principles and planning elements; and examining where international support proved effective or where gaps remain. By grounding the discussion in lived policy experience, this paper and the accompanying briefing aim to support policy-makers, practitioners, and international processes in moving beyond abstract commitments toward coherent, implementable pathways for a just, orderly, and equitable transition away from fossil fuels.

2.0 JETPs for TAFF planning and implementation

2.1 Rationale

JETPs are an innovative international finance mechanism that aims to bridge the financing and ambition gap in carbon-intensive emerging economies that face challenges in financing the high costs of decommissioning fossil fuel infrastructure, building renewable energy to replace it, and managing the social impacts of the transition. They intend to address, among others, the coordination challenge of mobilizing vast international capital for transition sectors (e.g., renewable energy) and transition elements with low returns on investment, like labour retraining and early coal retirement. In this case study, we reflect on the process of design and implementation of the four existing JETPs (South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Senegal)—which are at different stages of implementation and cover different fuels, financing partners, and national circumstances—to reflect on lessons that could be useful for potential international support mechanisms that could emerge in the context of TAFF roadmaps and processes.

2.2 JETPs: Overview

JETPs are a novel plurilateral cooperation model launched first for South Africa at the United Nations' 26th Climate Change Conference (COP 26) (Élysée, 2021) between an International Partners Group (IPG), led by the G7, and host countries (G7 Germany, 2022). Further host countries were announced in subsequent years: Indonesia and Vietnam in 2022 (European Commission, 2022a, 2022b), and Senegal in 2023 (European Investment Bank, 2023). They function as country-led platforms to accelerate decarbonization through capacity building and financing, in collaboration with donor countries, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and other development finance or green finance institutions, the private sector, and other partners. Key features of the individual JETPs are as follows:

- **South Africa:** The pioneering JETP was supported by the original IPG of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union (EU) with an initial commitment of USD 8.5 billion. It aims to break the country's dependence on the highly indebted state-owned utility Eskom and a coal-heavy energy mix (over 96% of energy production and 80% of power generation [International Energy Agency, 2026]) via measures such as the retirement and repurposing of coal plants. Social dialogue was managed by the Presidential Climate Commission and included labour, business, and civil society. Its first phase of implementation is guided by the JET Implementation Plan 2023–2027 and managed by the Project Management Unit, which is advised by other bodies, including the JET Inter-Ministerial Committee and the JET Government Steering Committee (Just Energy Transition, n.d.).

- **Indonesia:** Launched at the 2022 G20 Summit, this partnership pledged USD 10 billion in public funding from the IPG (led by Japan and the United States, and supported by Canada, Denmark, the EU, Germany, France, Norway, Italy, and the United Kingdom) to catalyze USD 10 billion in private financing from the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (JETP Indonesia, n.d.). It focuses on grid and captive coal power plants, with the aim of peaking power sector emissions by 2030. Its implementation is guided by the Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan (CIPP) and is managed through a JETP Secretariat with specific independent working groups (e.g., Technical Working Group, Finance Working Group) supporting the development of the CIPP.
- **Vietnam:** This USD15.8 billion partnership, launched in December 2022 with an IPG led by the EU and the United Kingdom, includes the United States, Japan, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Norway. It will provide USD 8.08 billion, aiming to catalyze USD 7.75 billion in private finance facilitated by the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (JETP Viet Nam, n.d.). The JETP aims to support Vietnam's goal of reaching net-zero by 2050. It primarily targets the power sector, aiming to cap coal capacity at 30.2 GW. It focuses on regulatory reform and the Resource Mobilization Plan to attract international investors. Social dialogue has been government-led, but the inclusion of independent environmental advocates and civil society organizations raises considerable challenges. Implementation is led by the Secretariat, the Secretariat Support Agency, and four working groups (covering synthesis; institutional, policy, and investment; technology and energy; and finance).
- **Senegal:** Launched in June 2023 with the IPG of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the EU, this USD 2.7 billion partnership focuses on development-oriented decarbonization. It aims to solve the energy access gap by achieving 100% electricity access while preventing long-term carbon lock-in from new domestic gas discoveries in Senegal (European Investment Bank, 2023). It covers technical assistance to improve grid stability and diversify the energy mix toward wind and solar, with a target of 40% renewable energy installed capacity by 2030. The governance structure includes a steering committee, a coordination unit, and working groups on governance, equity, finance, and technology. The Senegalese government is still developing its investment plan (Diop et al., 2025).

2.3 Principles and Elements to Consider in TAFF Roadmaps

The JETPs' experiences highlight several principles and shortcomings that are highly relevant for the design of international support structures for TAFF roadmaps. First, JETPs showed how plurilateral reciprocity can work, where increased national ambition is explicitly linked to coordinated international financial support, which is a good illustration of **Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) and international coordination** principles. In all four partnerships, host countries committed to structural transition goals in exchange for large-scale financing packages from donor governments, MDBs, and private investors. In this regard, JETPs should show how **predictable and reliable finance** is fundamental to triggering plurilateral reciprocity.

Second, a credible TAFF roadmap must incorporate **blended finance strategies**, where concessional loans and grants help unlock private investment in renewable energy, grid expansion, industrial decarbonization, and early fossil retirement. The JETP experience shows that public finance must be sufficient and reliable for blended finance structures to function. On this point, JETPs have been criticized for not mobilizing sufficient grants and concessional finance and slow or failed delivery of public finance (Karg et al., 2025).

Large-scale transitions require concessional financing and a long-term commitment; however, sufficient and reliable finance, both from private and public actors, has not always been guaranteed in the implementation of JETPs, in particular, for just transition measures. The first years of JETP implementation have shown major gaps in the funding on the table compared to the initial pledges and, even more starkly, compared to the finance needs of the plans put forward by host countries, in particular, for just transition purposes (Gverdtiteli, 2024). Moreover, recent instances (such as the 2025 U.S. withdrawal from several JETPs) illustrate how political shifts can undermine trust and weaken the very foundations of transition plans.

Third, TAFF roadmaps benefit from **clear sectoral trajectories**, typically through investment plans or policy frameworks (e.g., South Africa's JET Implementation Plan or Indonesia's CIPP) that translate political commitments into actionable timelines. For this, a very important principle is **national ownership**, which positions host countries at the centre of defining investment priorities, institutional arrangements, and long-term sectoral reforms. In this regard, some criticism had emerged regarding donor countries' influence on the definition of investment priorities in JETP investment plans and the large share of funding going to foreign organizations rather than national ones (Karg et al., 2025; Lehmann-Grube, 2024). However, having country-defined plans laying out what the transition looks like and what it requires is a key achievement of the JETPs and is a solid foundation for the implementation of the transition.

The JETPs are targeted at "just" energy transitions, and therefore emphasize **justice principles**, although inconsistently (e.g., criticism of the limited role of civil society participation and of limited concessional and grant-based finance). This is a reminder that justice elements should be embedded into TAFF processes, especially given the deep social and regional implications of fossil fuel phase-out.

Several practical elements emerge from the design and implementation of the JETPs that could be integrated into TAFF planning and international cooperation mechanisms. First, **TAFF roadmaps need structured governance arrangements** (e.g., the JETP Secretariats, steering committees, and working groups) to coordinate donors, national ministries, MDBs, and civil society. While setting institutional arrangements to implement the transition is a very good step forward, to ensure coherence among investment planning, policy reforms, and long-term transition strategies, caution and balance are needed when setting up governance structures. The complexity of those structures (e.g., multiple work groups and committees) could slow down decision making and implementation when the urgency of the transition challenges requires agility and effective decision-making processes.

Another key element, which is not very well implemented in all JETPs, is **structured social dialogue**. While approaches differ across countries, the JETPs show the indispensability of institutionalized spaces for labour, communities, and local authorities. One critique that has emerged on the process of setting up the JETPs and their investment and implementation plans is the limited or flawed role of **civil society engagement** (Kang et al., 2025). Flaws and shortcomings range from issues like a lack of background documents and short time frames for feedback (in South Africa and Indonesia) to severe obstacles like the arrest of advocacy figures of civil society in Vietnam. A good example comes from Senegal, where, based on previous JETP experiences in other countries, civil society groups created (in anticipation to the official consultations) the Platform of Civil Society Actors for a Just Energy Transition in Senegal, which aims to **strengthen public participation**, improve transparency, and establish **citizen-led monitoring mechanisms** (Mballo, 2024), which are key elements of a successful JETP implementation (Institute for Essential Services Reform, 2023).

Additionally, the JETPs underscore several lessons that are directly applicable to the next generation of international support mechanisms for TAFF roadmaps. One clear insight is that **multilateral and plurilateral finance platforms can meaningfully raise ambition** in emerging economies when they address both the high- and low-return components of the transition: renewable infrastructure, grid modernization, labour transition, and fossil fuel infrastructure retirement.

However, JETPs also show that **ambition and implementation depend on the integrity of governance structures**, particularly on strong secretariats, cross-ministerial coordination, and clear accountability arrangements. If such mechanisms are not strong, reversals in policy implementation of the transition can occur. For instance, Eskom has delayed its planned phase-out of several coal-fired power plants, and Indonesia cancelled its planned early retirement of the Cirebon plant (Reuters, 2025).

Another lesson is that policy reform and investment can advance simultaneously, not sequentially. In Indonesia and Vietnam, progress on regulatory reform has been essential for attracting private capital and unlocking investment pledges.

The JETPs also reinforce that **civil society participation is not optional**. In particular, the participation of vulnerable and underrepresented groups, such as Indigenous Peoples, women and youth, and representatives from the communities more affected by the transition, is important. Experiences from South Africa and Indonesia, and the more constrained civic space in Vietnam, demonstrate that limited inclusion can generate backlash, weaken implementation, and reduce trust in international support structures. Finally, the JETPs reveal that political instability and changes in political priorities in donor countries can disrupt implementation, highlighting the need for **more resilient international frameworks** that can withstand shifts in geopolitical or domestic political landscapes.

2.4 Gaps in International Support

While there have been no new JETP announcements since 2023, all the lessons learned from the implementation of JETPs can be applied to the next-generation country platforms¹ for international climate finance or to any other international support scheme that could emerge to support national TAFF roadmaps. Despite their innovation, a major gap in JETPs is the **shortfall of grants and concessional finance** relative to the scale of infrastructure and social needs in fossil-dependent countries. Many JETPs have relied heavily on loans, raising debt concerns and prompting criticism that they do not sufficiently derisk transitions for middle-income countries. Moreover, some critical actors in the transition, such as local governments, have difficulty meeting the criteria to access loans, limiting the roles they can play in the implementation of the transition (Naram et al., 2025).

There is also a gap in **finance delivery reliability**, with delays or reversals (such as the U.S. withdrawal from multiple JETPs in 2025) undermining confidence in the model. Finally, the JETPs highlight **insufficient coordination among donors** (governments, MDBs, and private financiers), pointing to the need for more streamlined, predictable, and politically insulated mechanisms to better support TAFF processes. Emerging initiatives to improve coordination include matchmaking platforms and project pipelines; however, significant coordination challenges remain (Curtin, 2024). This means moving away from short-term, donor-driven grant projects toward finance portfolios with broader coverage, including project preparation, capacity building, and enabling reforms that unlock large-scale finance. In several JETPs, grants were fragmented and tied to donor cycles, creating cliff effects and slowing implementation. Future efforts should strive for multi-year commitments rather than isolated project funding to protect investments from changes in donor cycles.

¹ Country platforms are defined by the Just Transition Climate Lab as “nationally led, multi-stakeholder mechanisms designed to align and coordinate international public and private finance in support of strategic development and climate goals” (Selvaraju et al., 2025) and include Egypt’s Nexus of Water, Food, and Energy Initiative; Brazil’s Climate and Ecological Transformation Investment Platform; and Colombia’s Country Platform for Climate and Development.

3.0 National sectoral processes for transitioning away from fossil fuels

3.1 Rationale

“Political gridlock” can be caused by the impacts of a decline in the concentrated costs of fossil fuels on specific regions and workers, which prevent standard political systems from acting on a fossil fuel phase-out. To overcome it, several countries have enacted national processes to create a consensus-based transition plan or strategy for fossil fuel use or production at the national or regional level. In this case study, we combine processes with different structures, focus, and scope to highlight that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to building a national TAFF roadmap; instead, each country should design a process that fits its specific national circumstances.

3.2 National Sectoral TAFF Processes: Overview

National processes include a diverse set of national-level stakeholder commissions (e.g., in Germany, Canada, and Chile) and transition agreements (e.g., in Denmark) used to negotiate the end of coal or oil regimes, which in most cases have resulted in subsequent legally binding instruments and roadmaps regulating the end of the industry. The processes included are the following:

- Germany’s Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment (informally known as the Coal Commission) was a national multistakeholder commission launched by the federal government in June 2018 to develop a consensual roadmap for phasing out both coal production (mining) and consumption (power generation) (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 2019). It consisted of a high-level dialogue involving 31 members from industry, unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academia. Notably, it assigned four co-chairs to manage divergent interests and resulted in a phase-out plan set for 2035–2038, with reviews every few years. This commission paved the way for the German parliament to adopt the Coal Exit Law in 2020, which translates the commission’s primary recommendation of phasing out coal by 2038 at the latest into a legally binding roadmap (Federal Government of Germany, 2026).
- Canada’s Task Force on Just Transition for Coal Power Workers and Communities was established by the government in 2018 to advise on supporting workers and communities affected by the phase-out of coal-fired electricity, focusing on skills training, economic diversification, and infrastructure to create a fair shift to a low-carbon economy (Government of Canada, n.d.). It prioritized “deliberation on the ground” through town halls and community visits, with specific mandates for gender balance and First Nations involvement.
- Chile’s Mesa de Trabajo sobre el Retiro de Carbón (Coal Removal Working Table) was a national-level stakeholder round table launched by the Ministry of Energy in

2018 to evaluate the social and economic effects of closing coal-fired plants (Ministry of Energy, n.d.-a). It involved coal companies, public institutions, NGOs, and the national electrical coordinator. It resulted in an agreed retirement schedule for coal power plants that would lead to a full phase-out by 2040, with periodic reviews every 5 years. This was the beginning of a process that included enacting new regulations and agreements, which resulted in the 2025 Decarbonization Plan, a roadmap of actions and measures to enable the phasing out of coal (Ministry of Energy, n.d.-b).

- Denmark's North Sea Agreement² was a national agreement reached in 2020 by the Danish government and a broad parliamentary majority to cancel future licensing rounds and end all oil and gas production. It was primarily a parliamentary and government-led process, coordinated with industry to ensure a just transition for offshore workers. It resulted in an end date set for production for 2050.

3.3 Principles and Elements to Consider in TAFF Roadmaps

National transition processes for phasing out fossil fuels demonstrate that **there is no universal design for TAFF roadmaps**; instead, each country must craft an approach aligned with its political economy, institutional architecture, and social landscape. A core process illustrated in these experiences is **deliberative transition governance**: the idea that durable fossil fuel phase-out pathways require structured, inclusive dialogue capable of overcoming the political gridlock created by concentrated local costs and diffuse national benefits. These processes also embody the principles of **country ownership**, **social dialogue as a democratic anchor**, and the **integration of just transition principles** into long-term energy-system planning.

These processes further reflect the importance of embedding **predictability and reviewability** into governance: most countries combined long time horizons with mandated revision cycles, ensuring plans remain responsive to economic shocks, technological change, and political transitions. This creates a compromise between political feasibility and environmental ambition, allowing progressive ratcheting of ambition as conditions evolve. For example, Chile retired 11 plants totalling 1,679 MW by 2024 (around 30% of 2019 capacity), and the government has estimated that by the end of 2026, another nine units totalling 2.2 GW will have been retired or converted (Ministry of Energy, n.d.-b). This fast progress led the government to propose moving the final deadline from 2040 to 2035 (Medinilla, 2025). Another example of this is Germany, where a proposal to push the phase-out date to 2030 failed to gain political buy-in at the federal level in 2024 but left room for the Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia (where political support and market conditions were more favourable) to adopt the 2030 deadline (Agora Energiewende, n.d.).

² The full name of the North Sea Agreement is the Aftale mellem regeringen (Socialdemokratiet), Venstre, Dansk Folkeparti, Radikale Venstre, Socialistisk Folkeparti og Det Konservative Folkeparti om fremtiden for olie- og gasindvinding i Nordsøen af 3. december 2020 (Agreement between the government (Social Democracy), the Liberal Party, the Danish People's Party, the Radical Left, the Socialist People's Party and the Conservative People's Party on the future of oil and gas extraction in the North Sea of 3 December 2020).

The design features of these national initiatives reveal several practical elements essential for effective TAFF planning. One is the need to define a **clear scope**, which can focus narrowly on workers and communities (as in Canada’s coal task force) or broadly on energy systems and regional restructuring (as in Germany’s Coal Commission). Another element is the use of **hybrid approaches** that blend soft, consensus-building processes (e.g., multistakeholder platforms, round tables, or community deliberations) with hard instruments, such as laws, retirement schedules, regulatory reforms, compensation mechanisms, and early retirement schemes, which anchor political agreements in enforceable commitments.

The cases also show that **meaningful social dialogue** must adapt to national contexts, spanning corporate–worker–government tripartite structures, broader multistakeholder negotiations, and localized consultations in affected territories. Additionally, TAFF planning requires **long-term horizons** (generally 10 to 30 years) paired with regular review cycles (often every 5 years) to measure implementation and recalibrate ambition. These elements help transform negotiated agreements into robust national roadmaps capable of guiding fossil fuel decline in ways that are socially legitimate and economically viable.

Across the cases, the central lesson is that **structured national platforms can unlock political consensus** in contexts where fossil fuel phase-outs would otherwise remain blocked. Germany, Chile, Denmark, and Canada all show that deliberative, government-mandated processes can translate contested political debates into actionable roadmaps—and, crucially, into legally binding instruments such as coal exit laws, transition agreements, and climate statutes. These experiences demonstrate that **sequencing matters**: starting with high-level dialogue and consensus-building, followed by regulatory and legislative codification and iterative review cycles that allow ambition to increase over time.

These experiences also show that **regional (or local) differences** must be embraced rather than avoided. Tailored measures for coal regions in Germany, alongside Canada’s gender-balanced, Indigenous-inclusive consultations, illustrate how national plans must account for regional and demographic heterogeneity. Finally, the cases highlight that **review cycles can act as political opportunity windows**, as illustrated by Chile, where faster-than-expected progress translated into increased ambition (Medinilla, 2025).

3.4 Gaps in International Support

While these national processes succeeded in building political legitimacy, several gaps in international support limited their ambition and replicability. Many countries had to design and fund these processes largely on their own, despite the complex analytical, social, and institutional work required to assess regional impacts, negotiate transition packages, and craft legally durable phase-out schedules. While most of those countries are Global North countries with higher capacities to lead and implement such complex and expensive processes, Global South countries will need international support to carry out similar processes.

International initiatives, with the exception of the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) support to Chile (PPCA, 2025), rarely provided **structured technical assistance, peer learning, or financial support** tailored specifically to the governance of fossil fuel phase-out. Other than European countries, which articulate efforts and knowledge sharing through

platforms like the EU Initiative for Coal Regions in Transition, many countries lack access to comparative methodologies for stakeholder engagement, socio-economic impact assessments, regional diversification planning, or legal design for phase-out pathways (European Commission, n.d.). Upcoming international efforts could fill these gaps by systematizing technical and political support, hosting peer-exchange platforms, and mobilizing financial instruments aligned with TAFF planning's unique governance needs.

4.0 National just transition/TAFF roadmaps

4.1 Rationale

Emerging cases of national roadmaps addressing fossil fuels, like those we present in this section (Colombia, Türkiye, and Brazil), illustrate increasing interest among countries around the world to address this important issue through sovereign-led transition governance approaches. This highlights countries' increasing awareness of the dangers of market-driven transitions and the need to address fossil fuels to meet their climate and energy targets. Unlike earlier processes that often focused narrowly on technical power sector targets or sectoral transition plans, these emerging initiatives demonstrate how countries are now treating the transition away from fossil fuels as a foundational macroeconomic and political issue. While the cases presented are at different stages (Brazil is in early design, Türkiye is in preparation, and Colombia is ready to start implementation) and cover different issues, we included them in a single case study to illustrate elements, principles, and lessons learned that could be useful for similar national roadmap initiatives.

4.2 Just TAFF Roadmaps: Overview

Key features of the individual national roadmap processes include the following:

Colombia

A comprehensive national roadmap for Just Energy Transition was finalized in 2025 by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética, n.d.). It uses a “six-chapter diagnosis” to plan a move from an extractive export model to a diversified, renewable-led economy. It covers both fossil fuel production (coal mines and oil and gas fields) and consumption (transport and industrial heat). Its main innovative strategies include direct public investment in energy democratization (community-owned energy) and re-industrialization through green hydrogen and biofuels, among others.

The roadmap resulted from a broader Just Energy Transition policy process, launched in 2023, which included, among others, a series of territorial dialogues, specifically in coal-dependent regions like La Guajira, integrating multiple knowledges (Indigenous and local) into technical planning (Energía, n.d.).

Türkiye

The evolution of just transition debates in Türkiye demonstrates an important example of how the transformation stems not only from climate targets but also from shifting geopolitical balances, technological improvements, and global competitiveness concerns. Although Türkiye does not yet officially have a target for a coal phase-out or a transition away from fossil fuels, preparation for a National Just Transition Strategy—to be completed by the end of 2026—has been launched by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to control the possible effects of

the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism imposed by its major trading partner, the EU. It is considered a noteworthy initiative that the just transition policy sphere, which leading national climate NGOs have been developing since 2019 by prioritizing coal regions, will gain official status and institutionalization through this strategy. However, the lack of a guiding main policy objective, such as a phase-out of fossil fuels, carries the risks of designing a just transition strategy isolated from its fundamental roots and failing to sufficiently benefit from the expertise accumulated by local actors and civil society organizations to date—thus, failing to address the emergency faced in the regions. These risks likewise apply to global just transition frameworks that operate in the absence of a TAFF roadmap.

Brazil

In December 2025, president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva edited a dispatch determining that the National Council on Energy Policy (a collegiate organ hosted by the energy ministry comprising several government offices, civil society, academia and the private sector) should produce the terms of reference for a roadmap for gradually reducing Brazil’s dependence on fossil fuels (Brazil 247, 2025) in 60 days. The executive order came a mere 3 months after Lula said that no country is ready to forgo oil and 2 months after Brazil gave the go-ahead for Petrobras to open a new major offshore oil frontier, the Mouth of the Amazon (De Freitas Moura, 2025). The content and timing of such a reduction of dependence are still to be determined, but ever since it included a mention of TAFF timelines in its nationally determined contribution (NDC), Brazil has been moving toward exerting political leadership on the issue while expanding production in the near future. The president’s dispatch, heavily influenced by ministers Marina Silva (Environment) and Fernando Haddad (Economy), will also help soften resistance within the government to an energy transition plan: since 2023, the energy ministry has been commissioned with outlining the energy transition strategy, but few concrete steps have been taken since. Now the laggards will have to move.

4.3 Principles and Elements to Consider in TAFF Roadmaps

The experiences of Colombia, Türkiye, and Brazil point to several foundational principles that should anchor any TAFF roadmap. First, the **CBDR** and **National Ownership** principles remain essential, as each country’s starting point, level of fossil dependence, and developmental needs vary widely. Roadmaps must therefore be self-determined but align with global TAFF goals while respecting different national circumstances. Similarly, the CBDR principle should also be applied at the subnational level. TAFF roadmaps must be grounded in **territorial differentiation and regional equity and grounding**. Fossil-dependent regions face unique social, economic, and historical vulnerabilities, and an effective roadmap must reflect these diverse realities to avoid entrenching past harms. As illustrated in Colombia’s plan, this principle not only means investing more in economic diversification and social programs in fossil fuel-dependent regions but also creating safeguards to ensure that new transition investments (e.g., renewable energy projects) do not replicate the unjust legacy of the fossil fuel industry, which often excluded local voices and prioritized resource extraction over community welfare.

Justice and a human rights approach are also key principles: procedural, distributive, and restorative justice need to shape the design of national planning processes (Van Uffelen et al., 2024). Colombia's roadmap exemplifies this through the mandated integration of Indigenous and local knowledge, democratization of energy systems through "Energy Communities" (Comunidades Energéticas), and recognition of the historical injustices experienced by fossil fuel-rich regions, such as Cesar and La Guajira. Court rulings, UN experts, and investigations show that La Guajira's coal extraction at the Cerrejón mine and Cesar's paramilitary violence caused serious human rights abuses, with accountability/remedy still in dispute in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and courts (Global Legal Action Network, 2021; Moor & van de Sandt, 2014). Safeguards to prevent the replication of extractive-era injustices, along with frameworks for addressing environmental liabilities, are essential to ensuring restorative outcomes. Such safeguards must also uphold the principle of **respect for human rights**. While none of the cases covered here are advanced enough in implementation to judge whether the plans will deliver justice on the ground, recognizing these principles from the outset of the transition plan can increase the chances that they will inform the implementation instruments to achieve the transition.

Another central principle is **policy coherence and long-term clarity**. Türkiye's process illustrates the risks of building a just transition strategy without a clear fossil phase-out goal, which can result in plans that are disconnected from the core purpose of the transition.

Regarding elements, in practical terms, national roadmap processes need to incorporate several essential elements illustrated in these case studies. A central component is **planning for structural economic transformation**, especially in fossil fuel-producing countries where transition implies not only decarbonizing energy systems but also replacing significant export revenues and fiscal income. This is evident in Colombia's effort to shift from an extractive export model to a diversified, renewable-led economy. In the case of Brazil, while it is unclear what government agencies will be involved in the design and implementation of the roadmap, considering the important role of exports in their approach to fossil fuel production, bringing economic government actors related to trade and fiscal aspects will be key to addressing the full scope of the transition. Effective TAFF planning also requires **strong participatory governance structures** that provide regionally grounded inputs and elevate Indigenous and local expertise. Colombia's Territorial Dialogues were an example of how these structures can start to be built and operate, but formalized structures (as opposed to these ad hoc structures) will be required to support the implementation of the transition.

Another element, although not very clearly illustrated in the roadmaps presented here, is that **fiscal and subsidy reforms must be built into the planning process** to address entrenched fossil fuel dependencies. Likewise, energy-system restructuring, including decentralization and community energy models, is critical to ensure the transition delivers distributive benefits; Colombia's "Energy Democratization" pillar is an example of how roadmaps can embed these ideas. Lastly, **cross-ministerial leadership and political coordination** are essential; Brazil's new mandate for a fossil-dependence reduction roadmap underscores how high-level political directives can overcome institutional inertia and accelerate planning. In contrast, the case of Colombia shows that a process led by a single ministry (in this case, the mining and energy ministry) risks falling short of triggering a whole-of-government approach to the transition that can speed up implementation.

Additionally, these national experiences reinforce several lessons from global transition processes that can guide TAFF planning. One clear insight is that **geopolitics, trade measures, and competitiveness concerns often act as major drivers of transition**. Türkiye's work on a national just transition strategy was primarily propelled by the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, demonstrating how external economic pressures can catalyze domestic planning even in the absence of explicit fossil phase-out commitments. The case of Brazil shows that **political leadership windows**, particularly when aligned with international engagements such as COP 30, can rapidly shift domestic priorities and unblock stalled processes. At the same time, global experience reveals that just transition frameworks need to be anchored in explicit fossil phase-out or reduction objectives to be most effective. The Türkiye example shows that processes that are not closely tied to the structural transformation risk becoming mainly technocratic exercises. The Colombian case also illustrates how participatory, **multistakeholder processes contribute to legitimacy**, which strengthens transition strategies.

4.4 Gaps in International Support

Taken together, these national roadmap processes reveal key gaps that upcoming international initiatives, such as the Santa Marta Conference and other 2026 efforts, could help address. There is currently **no coordinated international guidance on how to design a TAFF roadmap**, leaving countries to develop their own methodologies with limited alignment or shared standards. Important efforts in the development of such guidelines, such as the Equitable Framework and Finance for Extractive-based Countries in Transition (OECD, 2022) launched at COP 27 and developed through a multistakeholder process involving fossil fuel producers and consumers, are excellent steps in this direction. However, much more guidance on processual and implementation-bridging aspects is still needed.

Financial support remains insufficient for economic diversification, even though producer economies face significant fiscal risks from declining fossil revenues; climate finance instruments rarely target these needs. Another gap lies in the **lack of strong international expectations or incentives for explicit transitioning-away (e.g., phase-out) commitments**; Türkiye's experience shows how this absence allows national strategies to remain partial or disconnected from TAFF goals. Finally, countries like Brazil illustrate that domestic institutions often require **external diplomatic momentum or political leadership** to advance fossil fuel transition planning. International convenings in 2026 could play a critical role by providing legitimacy, coordination, and pressure that strengthen national reform processes.

5.0 Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T

5.1 Rationale

The New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) negotiations exposed a structural constraint in the global climate finance system gap that cannot be closed through United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) pledges alone: developing countries' ability to deliver NDCs and national adaptation plans is constrained by the high cost of capital, limited fiscal space, and debt burdens, while the scale-up required to reach the NCQG's ambition depends on coordinated reforms and action across the wider financial system (MDBs, development finance institutions, capital markets, credit enhancement mechanisms, and domestic enabling conditions). The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T was created to address this governance and coordination problem: translating a politically agreed finance scale-up call into a practical, multi-actor pathway for delivery, aligned with Article 2.1(c) in the Paris Agreement and with the NCQG architecture.

5.2 The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T: Overview

The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T is a COP-mandated, presidency-guided process mandated by the COP 29 launched under the NCQG decision at the 6th Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA6) and guided jointly by the CMA6 and CMA7 Presidencies (Azerbaijan and Brazil), in consultation with parties. Its mandate is to help enable the scaling-up of climate finance to developing country parties from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. This climate finance will support the development and implementation of NDCs and national adaptation plans, including through grants, concessional and non-debt instruments, and measures to create fiscal space. The roadmap focuses on international climate finance and the broader financial system enablers required for delivery, with explicit attention to developing country needs and to shifting the financing mix toward more concessional and non-debt instruments while mobilizing all sources of finance.

The process is anchored in a deliberately cross-institutional approach, seeking to link UNFCCC objectives with wider economic and financial agendas, in particular through the convening role of finance ministries and engagement with MDBs, bilateral and multilateral finance channels, and private capital mobilization, including links to G20 finance tracks. The presidencies were requested to deliver a report summarizing the work by CMA7, supported by structured outreach with parties and non-party stakeholders and a workplan/consultation cycle, with a stated delivery horizon to 2035. The roadmap process drew on guidance from other political coalitions and agenda-setting initiatives on international financial reforms that have grown since 2020 (Marques & Leão, 2025). These sources included Global South-led initiatives like the Bridgetown Initiative and the Africa Climate Summit's Nairobi Declaration and follow-up efforts at the Ethiopia-hosted 2025 Africa Climate Summit (African Union, 2025; Bridgetown Initiative, n.d.).

5.3 Principles and Elements to Consider in TAFF Roadmaps

The Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD 1.3T highlights how **governance design choices directly shape the credibility and usefulness of international road-mapping processes**. The Baku to Belém Roadmap process attracted extensive criticism for **consultations that were largely submission-based, opaque, and insufficiently dialogic**. In addition, civil society engagement was confined to UNFCCC channels while the finance-ministry track remained effectively shielded from scrutiny, undermining perceptions of **procedural fairness and ownership**. The lack of transparency and clarity around how inputs were used, combined with a confusing process architecture, weakened trust among parties and stakeholders. This was exacerbated by the failure to operationalize the civil society support group envisaged under the Ministers' Circle, creating frustration and reinforcing doubts about the “whole-of-society” logic underpinning the roadmap.

More broadly, the roadmap suffered from **weak institutional anchoring**: it remained loosely connected to the formal negotiation cycle, with no clear provisions for continuing deliberation under the CMA, nor for implementation or monitoring, ultimately resulting in COP 30 merely taking note of the outcome. Importantly, **the process was not designed to connect meaningfully with national-level planning or implementation**, leaving limited space for countries to translate the roadmap into domestically owned pathways aligned with their specific contexts and priorities. Other global finance reform agendas like Bridgetown and the Nairobi Declaration from the Africa Climate Summit also lacked institutional anchoring to drive the implementation of actions, but through their inclusive and political-level participation, they have had clearer routes to continued effort. Most notably, they both inspired commitments from many countries and the World Bank Group to include climate-resilient debt suspension clauses in sovereign lending instruments, allowing countries debt-repayment breathing room if a natural disaster strikes.

Finally, the postponement of the most substantive analytical component—detailing pathways to reach the USD 1.3 trillion target—to 2026 further undermined confidence in the roadmap's ability to guide near-term action. For TAFF roadmaps, this case underscores the importance of **transparent, genuinely participatory consultation models, clear linkages to decision-making and follow-up mechanisms, and explicit pathways to national ownership**, ensuring that international coordination reinforces country-led transition planning consistent with global goals.

5.4 Gaps in International Support

The Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD 1.3T exposes a broader gap in international support for complex transition agendas: **the absence of durable mechanisms that translate high-level coordination into sustained, country-relevant implementation support**. While the roadmap sought to align UNFCCC objectives with finance ministries and international financial institutions, it provided limited guidance on how international processes could concretely support national planning, implementation, and monitoring, weakening national ownership and follow through. The lack of institutionalized follow-up under the CMA, combined with postponed analytical work on delivery pathways and limited transparency

across coordination tracks, further reduced the roadmap's capacity to mobilize sustained support. For TAFF roadmaps, this highlights **the need for international frameworks that go beyond agenda setting to provide predictable, transparent, and nationally anchored support** capable of enabling durable, country-led transitions away from fossil fuels.

6.0 First-mover alliances

6.1 Rationale

Several first-mover coalitions have emerged to tackle the transition away from fossil fuels. The ones we examine here are

- the Coalition on Phasing Out Fossil Fuel Incentives Including Subsidies (COFFIS) (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2026)
- the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA, 2026)
- the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA) (2026b)
- the Global Clean Power Alliance (GCPA) Supply Chains Mission (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero & Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 2025)

These coalitions have emerged either to sustain or fill gaps in political momentum around a certain issue. They have been included in this case study collection because they present several lessons, particularly applicable to international TAFF roadmaps.

6.2 First-Mover Alliances: Overview

The main features of each coalition include the following:

- **COFFIS** addresses fossil fuel subsidy reform. It emerged at COP 28, in an attempt to facilitate peer government support to national efforts on fossil fuel subsidy reforms. COFFIS has also reactivated some long-standing international commitments on this reform within G7/G20 and UNFCCC. Launched in December 2023 at COP 28 with 12 founding countries, COFFIS now includes 17 members. COFFIS membership requires national (and potentially subnational) governments to publish an inventory of fossil fuel subsidies and reform action plans as a baseline and then demonstrate progress against this baseline year-on-year.
- The **PPCA**, launched in 2017 by the United Kingdom and Canada, is a global coalition of national and subnational governments, businesses, and financial institutions committed to phasing out unabated coal power in line with the Paris Agreement goals. It has grown steadily to include 180 members, supported by science-based membership criteria and differentiated expectations for OECD and non-OECD countries (PPCA, 2017). Importantly, the PPCA has become a major hub for knowledge exchange, policy learning, and capacity building on coal transition governance.
- **BOGA**, launched by Denmark and Costa Rica in 2021, is the first diplomatic initiative focused specifically on the managed phase-out of oil and gas production. BOGA combines political leadership with practical incentives, such as a transition fund for members (BOGA, 2026a), and a tiered membership structure (“core members,” “associate members,” and “friends”) that reflects different levels of commitment and

varied national circumstances, as well as a network of “partners” that support their mission, including intergovernmental and multilateral institutions.

- **GCPA Supply Chains Mission**, launched at the Future of Energy Security Summit in London in April 2025, brings together governments, industry, and international organizations to identify and act on practical supply chain problems that currently impede the rapid deployment of clean power. It focuses on addressing supply chain data gaps, confronting bottlenecks in manufacturing and the deployment of grid components, promoting a circular economy for critical materials, and enhancing value chains for resource-rich but often under-resourced emerging and developing economies through finance derisking, skills development, and technology access. It is a recent initiative and, as such, its results are yet to be published.

6.3 Principles and Elements to Consider in TAFF Roadmaps

First-mover alliances illustrate the principle that international cooperation can advance domestic phase-out agendas by lowering political risk and legitimizing early action. Alliances like the PPCA and BOGA also attempt to operationalize the principle of **CBDR** through differentiated expectations: the PPCA sets stricter coal phase-out timelines for OECD countries, while both alliances recognize that ambition levels differ based on national capabilities and development needs. Another core principle shared by all three alliances is **peer learning as a core design feature**, demonstrating that coordinated knowledge exchange and collective norm-setting can accelerate national transitions. The PPCA demonstrates the value of embedding **science-based benchmarks**, clear eligibility criteria, and regular progress tracking, ensuring members align with Paris-compatible timelines for coal phase-out.

All alliances show the importance of creating **multiple entry points to maximize membership**. BOGA, on the one hand, has a tiered membership (core, associate, and friend members), which accommodates countries at different stages of readiness while still promoting upward convergence. The PPCA, on the other hand, involves a wide range of members, including **private sector actors**, utilities, investors, and subnational governments, highlighting the need for TAFF planning to integrate non-state actors who hold key levers for implementation.

COFFIS offers an example of how **both production and consumption** can be addressed simultaneously, as it covers both producer and consumer subsidies. Despite the varying degrees of progress achieved by its members, COFFIS also provides a practical example of how countries can establish **shared expectations and common denominators** while allowing national flexibility and national ownership in implementation—a balance likely to be central for TAFF roadmaps. Finally, COFFIS has **time-bound commitments**: November 2024 (COP 29) was the deadline for original members to publish fossil fuel subsidy inventories, and November 2025 (COP 30) was the deadline for original members to publish their action plans. While the system requires some form of a monitoring and reporting system in place, the compliance mechanisms associated with it have not been strong enough to guarantee that failure to achieve progress can be addressed effectively, pointing to the importance of **strong monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) mechanisms** for TAFF roadmaps.

The GCPA Supply Chains Mission emphasizes the importance of addressing supply chain constraints and aligning industrial policy with climate goals within national transition planning. It also highlights the importance of ensuring that markets for clean power, from transmission equipment to recycled materials, function efficiently and equitably.

6.4 Gaps in International Support

A major lesson from PPCA is that **sustained knowledge exchange and capacity building** can drive incremental but steady membership growth and help late adopters learn directly from early movers. BOGA adds the insight that **incentive structures matter**: its transition fund shows that material support can amplify political will and attract countries that lack the financial or technical resources to commit to phase-out pathways. The GCPA Supply Chains Mission aims to address gaps in supply chain coordination but also highlights missing ingredients in data availability and the lack of finance and capacity support for emerging and developing economies needed to maximize their value chains and participation in the global clean industrial economy.

Despite their contributions, all alliances reveal gaps in structured global support for fossil fuel phase-out. They **rely heavily on voluntary political leadership and philanthropy**, rather than being embedded in a broader international framework that could scale up technical assistance, financing, and monitoring. Neither initiative provides comprehensive support for the developing country's needs. Upcoming international processes could build on these foundations by creating **systematic peer-learning platforms**, expanding dedicated transition finance, and developing **global benchmarks for fossil fuel phase-out** that complement alliance-based leadership.

7.0 Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap

7.1 Rationale

Methane emissions from oil and gas supply chains represent a major near-term climate risk, yet they are primarily governed through fragmented energy regulation and trade relationships, creating a coordination gap that UNFCCC processes alone cannot address.

Driven by international momentum through initiatives such as the Global Methane Pledge (n.d.) and legislation such as the EU Methane Regulation (2024/1787), methane emission reduction has become a central component of the EU's climate diplomacy and energy transition efforts.

Producer countries will be directly affected by the EU Methane Regulation, particularly regarding the requirements imposed on fossil fuel imports. Methane abatement partnerships can support exporting countries in aligning with these requirements while reinforcing their domestic climate ambitions.

7.2 Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap: Overview

The EU launched the Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap (MAPR) as a strategic initiative to foster collaboration with major fossil fuel-producing countries beyond its borders (European Commission, 2024). It aims to support producer countries in taking earlier and more ambitious action on methane abatement before the EU's Methane Regulation on fossil fuel imports becomes fully binding. It provides a framework for technical assistance, financial support, and knowledge sharing, encouraging producer countries to progressively align with EU standards on MRV while respecting their national sovereignty and development priorities. According to the Environmental Investigation Agency (2025),

Its cooperative, partnership-based model recognizes that methane emissions are a cross-border challenge that cannot be solved by top-down regulation alone. Achieving rapid reductions requires coordinated action across the entire fossil fuel value chain, from production to distribution, with shared commitments, incentives, and technical cooperation between governments, industry, and civil society. (p. 5)

The MAPR can be implemented through bilateral agreements between the EU member states and individual exporting countries. In a bilateral arrangement, the partners formally agree on methane reduction targets and cooperation measures, such as technical assistance, financing, or regulatory alignment, tailored to the specific needs and conditions of the partner country. In this case, bilateral agreements offer flexibility and targeted support but are resource intensive to negotiate and enforce. Their success hinges on sustained political will and robust monitoring structures.

7.3 Principles and Elements to Consider in TAFF Roadmaps

The MAPR demonstrates how climate objectives can be advanced not only through traditional climate diplomacy, but also through energy and trade governance mechanisms that directly shape market behaviour. The objectives set out by the MAPR can be considered a good example of a TAFF roadmap. Methane abatement must be an essential part of oil and gas producers' efforts to transition away from fossil fuels. It represents an initial risk-reduction step that cuts near-term emissions and builds regulatory capacity, not a licence to prolong fossil fuel production or delay action on managed decline.

MAPR points to several foundational principles that should anchor any TAFF roadmap.

First, it illustrates that an effective transition away from fossil fuels must include importer–exporter dialogue and use market access, regulation, and finance to influence real energy-system decisions. Second, it should complement, not compete with, UNFCCC processes.

The framework is closely analogous to a TAFF-style roadmap at the global or UNFCCC level, insofar as it relies on joint political commitments, technical coordination, dedicated **financial support, robust MRV systems**, and progressive regulatory alignment to drive implementation while respecting the **principle of national ownership**.

Its primary strength lies in its implementation design: instead of imposing rigid mandates or automatic penalties, the framework creates alignment pressures that encourage participation and gradual convergence. Importantly, it has clear time horizons within a multi-stage process rather than a one-off initiative, progressing from measurement to regulation and ultimately implementation, with follow-up mechanisms intended to ensure review and accountability over time. At the same time, methane abatement partnerships represent a crucial tool for achieving substantial emission reductions within oil and gas supply chains and could serve as an entry point for a managed **decline in fossil fuel production and use**.

7.4 Gaps in International Support

The roadmap remains limited in its guidance on how technical and financial assistance can be delivered in practice, particularly to partner countries with weaker institutional or fiscal capacity. As a result, its effectiveness will ultimately depend on whether the cooperative architecture it establishes can be translated into concrete support mechanisms that enable meaningful and sustained methane reductions across diverse jurisdictions.

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Published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development

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